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AB 5 TRAC T. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Seventh Cir-
cuit have taken the position that Title VII's bar to employment discrimination "because
of ... sex" applies to discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) per-
sons. This interpretation follows from the ordinary meaning of the statute, read as a whole and
in light of its purpose. If an employer fires a woman because she is married to another woman,
rather than a man, the employer has, literally, acted "because of" her sex (if she had been a man,
marriage to a woman would have been fine) and because of the sex of her partner. It is difficult
to deny that "sex" is not at least one "motivating factor" in the employment decision, which is all
that the current version of Title VII requires for liability. Moreover, this reading of Title VII ac-
cords with its purpose, which is to entrench a merit-based workplace where specified traits or
status-based criteria (race, color, national origin, religion, and sex) are supposed to be irrelevant
to a person's job opportunities.
Treating antigay discrimination as a form of sex discrimination is not a new idea, but for
several decades most federal judges have rejected it, and most members of Congress have ig-
nored it. This, however, is an idea that has ripened over time. New circumstances have rendered
the argument not only plausible but also compelling. The most significant new development has
been evolving social facts and assumptions about sex minorities: in 1964, employees thought to
be "homosexuals" were outside the scope of the merit-based workplace, because Americans be-
lieved them to be mentally ill, psychopathic, and predatory. Today, those views have been dis-
credited. This shift in thought connects with a second new circumstance: a radically different
constitutional baseline. As late as 2003, "homosexuals" could constitutionally be considered pre-
sumptive criminals, but the Supreme Court has for twenty years been developing a constitution-
al norm that gay people cannot be singled out for special legal exclusions without a rational pub-
lic justification. Indeed, the Court has ruled that the constitutional right to marry applies to
same-sex (i.e., "homosexual") couples. It is constitutionally jarring to know that, in most states,
a lesbian couple can get married on Saturday and be fired from their jobs on Monday, without
legal redress.
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A third new development has been the formal evolution of Title VII itself. Judges as well as
commentators have largely ignored the "statutory history" of Title VII-its formal evolution
through a process of amendment by Congress and authoritative interpretation by the Supreme
Court. The Trump Administration and other skeptics of a broad reading of sex discrimination
maintain that Title VII divides the world into males and females, and does nothing more than
require employers to apply the same rules to both sexes. According to this view, antihomosexual
workplace exclusions or harassment operates equally on both sexes (i.e., both lesbians and gay
men are harmed). But the Supreme Court has authoritatively interpreted Title VII to bar gender
stereotyping, which also operates to protect both male and female employees alike. Congress rat-
ified and expanded upon that interpretation in its 1991 Amendments to Title VII, which also re-
affirmed its statutory mission to ensure a merit-based workplace free from sex-based decision
making, even when sex is but one "motivating factor" in the discrimination. Because LGBT per-
sons are gender minorities and because anti-LGBT discrimination is rooted in rigid gender roles,
Tide VII today bars discrimination because of the sex of the employee's partner/spouse, just as it
bars discrimination because of the race or religion of his or her partner/spouse.
A UT H 0 R. John A. Garver Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School. I deeply appreciate
excellent research assistance and editorial guidance from Eric Baudry, Yena Lee, Charlotte
Schwartz, Daniel Strunk, and Todd Venook (all Yale Law School Class of 2019). I am also grate-
ful for valuable comments from Martha Ertman, Steve Calabresi, Guido Calabresi, Sharra Greer,
Heather Gerken, Abbe Gluck, Pat McGlone, John Davis Malloy, Judith Sandalow, Vicki Schultz,





I. THE MERIT-BASED WORKPLACE AND THE MEANING OF TITLE VII 334
A. The Merit-Based Workplace 334
B. Original Meaning of Title VII 337
C. Dynamic Title VII 341
II. THE THREE FACES OF DISCRIMINATION "BECAUSE OF SEX": ENSURING A
MERIT-BASED WORKPLACE 342
A. Sex as Biology: Relational Discrimination 343
1. The Early History of Title VII and the 1972 Amendments 347
2. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 353
3. Constitutional Challenges to Same-Sex Sodomy Laws and Same-Sex
Marriage Bars 357
B. Sex as Gender: Homophobia as Prescriptive Sex Stereotyping 362
1. The 1964 Act and the 1972 Amendments 363
2. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 and the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993 365
3. Hopkins and the 1991 Amendments 368
C. Sex as Sexuality: Sexual Harassment and the Merit-Based Workplace 381
III. TITLE VII'S MERIT-BASED WORKPLACE UNDER A TEXTUALIST COURT AND
A GRIDLOCKED CONGRESS 393
324
THE SEX DISCRIMINATION ARGUMENT FOR LGBT WORKPLACE PROTECTIONS
INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bars employment discrimination
"because of. . . sex."' A successful part-time teacher at Ivy Tech Community
College, Kimberly Hively, complained that the college refused to consider her
for a permanent job because she is a lesbian. If true, does that refusal constitute
discrimination because of sex? Because Title VII does not bar discrimination
"because of .. . sexual orientation," federal appeals courts have uniformly said
"no" to this question-until the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, reconsidered
the issue.2
Writing for the en banc, eight-judge majority in Hively v. Ivy Tech Commu-
nity College of Indiana,' Chief Judge Diane Wood offered two interconnected
arguments to support the holding that an employer's refusal to hire a lesbian
constitutes discrimination because of sex. Reading the statute literally, judges
in sex discrimination cases often ask whether the plaintiff has shown that the
employer would have treated a similarly situated "comparator" (a person of the
opposite sex) more favorably. If Hively had been a man, sexually cohabiting
with or married to a woman, the college would have considered him for per-
manent employment on his merits. Ivy Tech allegedly rejected Hively out of
hand because she was a woman partnered with another woman. Hence, she
was allegedly denied the job "because of . .. [her] sex" as a woman rather than
a man. This line of reasoning is often called the "comparator argument."'
In the alternative, Chief Judge Wood reasoned that Hively was discriminat-
ed against because of the sex of her intimate associate (her partner).' A prece-
dential basis for this "associational discrimination argument" is Loving v. Vir-
ginia,6 where the Supreme Court ruled that state discrimination against
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 200oe-2(a) to (d) (2012).
2. In an agency adjudication, where the EEOC has lawmaking authority, the agency has inter-
preted Title VII to bar discrimination because of sexual orientation - a development that has
helped trigger the circuit courts' focus on this issue. See Baldwin v. Foxx, No. 0120133080,
2015 WE 4397641 (E.E.O.C. July 15, 2015).
3. 853 F.3d 339 ( 7 th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (vacating a thoughtful panel opinion by Judge Ilana
Rovner, who followed but suggested revisiting circuit precedent on this issue and who later
joined the en banc majority), vacating 830 F.3 d 698 ( 7 thCir. 2016).
4. Hively, 853 F.3d at 345-47; accord. id. at 357-59 (Flaum, J., concurring). On the comparator
argument, see Suzanne Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 752
(2011).
5. Hively, 853 F.3 d. at 347-49 (majority opinion); accord id. at 357-59 (Flaum, J., concurring).
6. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). For early elaborations of the associational discrimination argument, see
Matthew Clark, Comment, Stating a Title VII Claim for Sexual Orientation Discrimination in
the Workplace: The Legal Theories Available After Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, 51 UCLA L.
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interracial couples constitutes discrimination because of race. For the same rea-
son that state discrimination against a black woman cohabiting with or married
to a white man is race discrimination, Ivy Tech's discrimination against a wom-
an cohabiting with or married to another woman is sex discrimination. In the
first case, the regulatory variable - the factor that changes the legal treatment -
is the race of the associated person; in the second case, the regulatory variable
is the sex of the associated person.
Writing for three dissenting judges, Judge Diane Sykes criticized these
formal arguments as an excessively dynamic, "judge-empowering" interpreta-
tion of the statutory language.' Focusing on the original meaning of the statu-
tory text, Judge Sykes argued that "sex" in 1964 only meant one thing-the two
biological sexes (male and female) - and could not have meant "sexual orienta-
tion," a term not widely used in 1964.8 In contrast, Congress has in subsequent
statutes, such as the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Pre-
vention Act of 2oo9,9 specifically prohibited discrimination because of "sexual
orientation" as well as because of "sex," indicating that the two terms have
different meanings.o In ordinary parlance today, Judge Sykes argued, no one
would say that workplace gay-bashing constitutes "discrimination because of
sex"; almost everyone would say that it is "discrimination because of sexual
orientation."" Not only does "sexual-orientation discrimination spring[] from
a wholly different kind of bias than sex discrimination,"12 but the only legiti-
mate means to update the statute in this way is through the legislative pro-
cess.
13
Concurring in most of Chief Judge Wood's opinion, Judge Joel Flaum
(joined by Judge Kenneth Ripple) maintained that the text, read in light of the
whole Act, supported Hively's Title VII claim. Given the allegations in the
complaint, Judge Flaum found it hard to deny that Ivy Tech excluded her at
least in part either because of her sex (the comparator argument) or because of
REv. 313 (2003); and Mark W. Honeycutt II & Van D. Turner, Jr., Comment, Third-Party As-
sociative Discrimination Under Title VII, 68 TENN. L. REV. 913 (2001).
7. Hively, 853 F.3 d at 360 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 362-63 (surveying a few dictionaries of the 1964 period to determine the meaning of
"sex" as nothing more than the biological differences between men and women).
9. Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, 18 U.S.C.
5 249(a) (2) (2012).
10. Hively, 853 F.3 d at 363-65 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
ii. Id. at 362-63, 365-67.
12. Id. at 367.
13. Id. at 372-74.
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the sex of her romantic partner (the associational discrimination argument).14
In response to Judge Sykes's point that this was just a case of sexual orientation
discrimination, Judge Flaum observed that it had elements of both sex-based
and sexual orientation-based discrimination.s Because Title VII was amended
in 1991 to bar sex discrimination even when sex is only one "motivating factor,"
today's statute supported Hively.16
In contrast to other judges in the majority, concurring Judge Richard Pos-
ner suggested that Chief Judge Wood's opinion was not dynamic enough. He
joined her majority opinion but also maintained, contrary to Judge Sykes, that
judges should "update" statutes based upon current social norms and their un-
derstanding of the best workplace policy." Homosexuality has become suffi-
ciently normalized in society that judges should dynamically interpret Title VII
to reflect its most efficient deployment.
The same issue also recently divided the Eleventh Circuit. In Evans v. Geor-
gia Regional Hospital," the panel, in an opinion by District Judge Jose Martinez,
held that a lesbian might have a Title VII claim for sex discrimination if the
employer denied her opportunities because of gender stereotyping but has no
Title VII claim for simple sex discrimination, even if she was denied a job be-
cause she is romantically attracted only to women. 9 Dissenting on the latter
point, Judge Robin Rosenbaum argued that the gender stereotyping argument
went further than the majority recognized and instead justified Title VII pro-
tection for female employees who depart from the deep stereotype that women
should find romantic love with the right man, not the right woman.2 0 Concur-
ring in Judge Martinez's opinion, Judge William Pryor Jr. argued that Judge
Rosenbaum's interpretation would amount to an amendment, rather than an
interpretation, of the statute.2 1 Counsel for Jameka Evans plans to petition the
Supreme Court for review of the Eleventh Circuit's decision.22
Chief Judge Robert Katzmann of the Second Circuit has also recently urged
a reconsideration of his court's precedent declining to apply Title VII to bar
14. Id. at 357-59 (Flaum, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 358.
16. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 200oe-2(m) (2012)).
17. Id. at 352-55 (Posner, J., concurring).
18. 850 F.3 d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017).
ig. Id. at 1253-57.
20. Id. at 1261, 1264-65 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
21. Id. at 1261 (Pryor, J., concurring).
22. Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, LAMIBDA LEGAL, http://www.Lambdalega.org/in-court
/cases/ga evans-v-ga-regional-hospita [http://perma.cc/49UG-8RUS].
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sexual orientation discrimination.2 3 Like Chief Judge Wood, Chief Judge
Katzmann found persuasive both the comparator and the associational discrim-
ination arguments;24 like Judge Rosenbaum, he opined that anti-LGBT dis-
crimination involves gender stereotypes that the Supreme Court has ruled can-
not be the basis for employment decisions in the merit-based workplace.25
Chief Judge Katzmann also addressed the argument, previously accepted by the
Second Circuit, that Congress had "ratified" the previous court of appeals deci-
sions because it did not override them in its 1991 Amendments and because it
declined to enact any one of several dozen bills specifically seeking to bar sexual
orientation discrimination. Following the Supreme Court, he cautioned against
drawing legal meaning from "a proposal that does not become law. Congres-
sional inaction lacks persuasive significance because several equally tenable in-
ferences may be drawn from such inaction, including the inference that the ex-
isting legislation already incorporated the offered change."2 6
Following Chief Judge Katzmann's suggestion, the Second Circuit has
granted en banc review of this issue in Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc.27 The
EEOC filed an amicus brief in that case, defending its view that LGBT employ-
ees like Donald Zarda are protected by Title VII.28 The Trump Administration's
Department of Justice, however, subsequently filed an amicus brief supporting
the opposite interpretation on precisely the grounds rejected by Chief Judge
Katzmann, namely, that Congress ratified the older court of appeals cases when
it amended Title VII in 1991 and when it rejected bills that would have amend-
ed Title VII or created a new statute to protect against sexual orientation dis-
crimination specifically.2 9 In an appendix, the Justice Department's brief listed
sixty-two bills introduced in Congress between 1974 and 2017 that would have
23. Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F-3d 195, 201-07 (2d Cir. 2017) (Karzmann, C.J.,
concurring).
24. Id. at 201-05.
25. Id. at 205-o6.
26. Id. at 206 (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990)).
An eminent political scientist as well as law professor, Chief Judge Katzmann is renowned
for his deep understanding of the legislative process and its relationship to statutory inter-
pretation. See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014), insightfully reviewed by
Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118 (2016).
27. Order Granting En Banc Review, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., No. 15-3775 (2d Cir. May
25, 2017).
28. En Banc Brief for Amicus Curiae Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in Support
of Plaintiffs/Appellants and in Favor of Reversal, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., No. 15-
3775, (2d Cir. June 23, 2017).
29. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., No. 15-3775,
(2d Cir. July 26, 2017).
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addressed, in a variety of ways, the treatment of sexual and gender minorities
in the workplace. Like most proposed legislation, a large majority of the bills
died in committee, without hearings or any kind of vote. Over the last forty
years, congressional committees held hearings on ten of these bills, and three
were voted upon by one chamber (failing 49-50 in the first case, passing one
chamber in the other two cases).o
With such a dramatic split in the circuits and even within the executive
branch, the issue should soon reach the Supreme Court." Ironically, the for-
malism of Chief Judge Wood's and Judge Flaum's approach would be attractive
to the Supreme Court Justices (such as Justice Thomas) least inclined, ideolog-
ically, to read Title VII to protect LGBT employees and would be an incomplete
analysis to some of the Justices (such as Justice Breyer) most likely to read Title
VII more broadly. The whole act analysis suggested by Judge Flaum ought to
be appealing to Chief Justice Roberts,3 2 but would the Chief be willing to in-
terpret a civil rights law expansively? Will the Supreme Court divide along
predictably ideological and political lines -or might the legal arguments pro-
vide a canvas to debate the issue in the relatively nonideological manner the
30. The Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 11 3 th Cong. (2013) passed in the
Senate 64-32 on November 7, 2013, 159 CONG. REc. S7907-o9 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 2013), but
died in the House Judiciary Committee; the Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007,
H.R. 3685, ioth Cong. (2007), passed in the House 235-184 on November 7, 2007, 153
CONG. REC. 30,392-93 (2007), but then died on the Senate Legislative Calendar; the Em-
ployment Non-Discrimination Act of 1996, S. 2056, 104th Cong. (1996), failed passage in
the Senate 49-50 on September io, 1996, 142 CONG. REC. 22,477 (1996). In addition to these
three bills, Congress (through a committee in one chamber) held hearings on S. 813 and
H.R. 3685 and on eight other bills listed in the Justice Department brief: the Employment
Non-Discrimination Act of 2009, S. 1584, 111th Cong. (2009); the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act of 20o9, H.R. 3017, 111th Cong. (2009); the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 2015, ioth Cong. (2007); the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act of 2002, S. 1284, 107th Cong. (2002); the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act of 1997, S. 869, io5th Cong. (1997); the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act of 1996, S. 2238, 104th Cong. (1996); the Civil Rights Amendments Act
of 1981, H.R. 1454, 9 7 th Cong. (1981); and the Civil Rights Amendments Act of 1979, H.R.
2074, 9 6th Cong. (1979). Congress has yet to take any action on the most recently intro-
duced bill: Equality Act, S. 1oo6, 115 th Cong. (2017), introduced by Sen. Merldey on May 2,
2017.
31. Ivy Tech is not seeking review of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Hively, perhaps because
that school has an internal policy barring discrimination against lesbian employees. See
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F-3d 3 3 9 , 351 n-7 (2017).
32. E.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 2480 (2015) (declining to read specific text literally, in light of
the "plan" and structure of the Affordable Care Act of 2010).
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Seventh Circuit did?" A related issue is whether Title VII's sex discrimination
bar protects transgender employees. For reasons I find persuasive, Judge Pryor
has joined Judge Rosemary Barkett's panel opinion ruling that it does, a judg-
ment followed by most other federal judges, including a recent Seventh Circuit
panel.34 Note that Judge Pryor liberally interprets discrimination because of sex
to include discrimination because of one's self-reported sex and discrimination
because of gender stereotyping, but is not willing to include discrimination be-
cause of the sex of one's partner.
Hively, Evans, and Zarda not only tee up important substantive issues of job
discrimination, but also methodological issues regarding the proper approach
to statutory interpretation in general, and dynamic statutory interpretation in
particular. Broadly speaking, the Seventh Circuit judges followed three differ-
ent methodological approaches. Judge Sykes applied what she considered to be
Title VII's original meaning: the objective meaning (to a reasonable speaker) en-
tailed by the statutory text, "discrimination because of . .. sex."" Judge Posner
called for judicial dynamic interpretation of Title VII, whose original meaning, in
his view, has been rendered obsolete by changed social and workplace norms.36
Chief Judge Wood followed a pragmatic approach that considers statutory text,
purpose, and precedents, as well as relevant constitutional norms and direc-
33. The Seventh Circuit en banc majority included merit-based purposivist judges such as Di-
ane Wood and David Hamilton, conservative textualists Joel Flaum, Frank Easterbrook, and
Kenneth Ripple, and conservative pragmatist Richard Posner.
34. Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3 d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011) (Barkett, J., for a unanimous panel including
Judge Pryor); accord Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3 d 566 (6th Cir. 2004); Schroer v. Billing-
ton, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C. 20o6); cf Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified
Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F-3 d 1034, 1048, 1049 (7 th Cit. 2017) (Williams, J., for a
unanimous panel including Chief Judge Wood) (applying Hively to protect transgender
students under Title IX).
3s. Hively, 853 F.3 d at 360-62 (Sykes, J., dissenting); cf ANTONIN SCAIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,
READING LAw: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 82 (2012) (arguing for an original
meaning approach to statutory and constitutional interpretation).
36. Hively, 853 F.3d at 352-55 (Posner, J., concurring); cf WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 9-11 (1994) (arguing that judges as a practical matter will in-
terpret statutes dynamically in light of changed circumstances, but also suggesting rule-of-
law limits to dynamic interpretation).
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tives." Chief Judge Katzmann is also an advocate of a pragmatic approach that
considers various sources for understanding statutory meaning."
A pragmatic approach is most consistent with the approach to statutory in-
terpretation long followed by the U.S. Supreme Court. Part I of this Feature
will suggest that the seemingly simpler approaches followed by Judges Posner
and Sykes require consideration of the wider array of sources explored by Chief
Judge Wood and by this Feature. Generally, Part I maintains that Title VII's
statutory plan -entrenchment of a merit-based workplace as regards the crite-
ria listed in the law -must inform the analysis of any judge, whether she be an
original meaning textualist, a dynamic interpreter, or a pragmatist. Original
meaning analysis, properly set forth, produces a much more complicated in-
quiry than the arbitrary choices made by Judge Sykes. Dynamic interpretation
requires better grounding in traditional legal materials than Judge Posner at-
tempts. And a legal pragmatic analysis needs to explore more materials than
Chief Judge Wood analyzes in her opinion for the court in Hively.
The main theme of this Feature is that any judicial interpretation of Title
VII's text, purpose, or precedents is incomplete, from any methodological point
of view, without an exploration and understanding of the statutory history (con-
gressional amendments and authoritative interpretations) as well as the legisla-
tive history of Title VII and its amendments. Part II will offer such an exegesis of
Title VII's statutory history, namely, its formal evolution through authoritative
interpretation and congressional amendments. Part II will contrast statutory his-
tory, which has never been a controversial source of guidance in statutory in-
terpretation, with legislative history, the internal congressional materials gener-
ated in the process of statutory deliberation and enactment, which has been
controversial within the Court. Notwithstanding criticism, the Court still relies
on legislative history tied to statutory text created by Congress. Indeed, Justice
Scalia, the father of the strict new textualism, has said that judges should con-
sult a law's legislative history for the same reason he and other textualists con-
sult the Federalist Papers in constitutional cases - namely, to help the judge un-
derstand the meaning of words, phrases, and structures Congress has
enacted." Accordingly, Part II will examine the legislative history of Title VII
37. Hively, 853 F.3 d at 343-45 (Wood, C.J., writing for the majority) (citing a variety of sources
that judges ought to consider when interpreting statutes); cf William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 383-84
(1990) (arguing that judges will and ought to consider text, the whole act, statutory prece-
dents, legislative history, regulatory history, and larger norms when interpreting statutes).
38. See IATZMANN, supra note 26.
39. Antonin Scalia & John F. Manning, A Dialogue on Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation,
So GEO. WASH. L. REv. 161o, 1618 (2012). For a more extended defense along those lines, see
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and its amendments only insofar as they help us understand the meaning of
the words, phrases, and structures actually enacted into law. Contrast this ap-
proach with the Department of Justice's Zarda amicus brief, which has the vice
of not tying its legislative inaction arguments to text adopted by Congress. In-
stead, the Department gestures toward a link to the 1991 Amendments without
actually citing any relevant new statutory text.
Title VII's statutory history establishes the following points of law that are
relevant to Hively, Evans, and Zarda. First, Title VII is equally committed to
purging the workplace of arbitrary sex-based, race-based, and religion-based
criteria. Congress and, eventually, the Supreme Court have rejected the ap-
proach initially followed by the EEOC, whereby enforcement was focused on
race discrimination, with discrimination because of sex and religion assuming a
subordinate position. As the plain language suggests, the statute presumptively
follows the same precepts for race-, sex-, and religion-based discrimination-
except where the text explicitly creates a distinct regime, as it does for bona fide
occupational qualifications, which are not available to justify discrimination be-
cause of race.40 Even employment decisions motivated only in part by a disap-
proved criterion are now questionable under the statute as amended in 1991.
Second, Title VII not only bars employment practices that treat all women
differently from all men, but also bars practices that treat some men or some
women differently because of their sex or because of the sex of their spouses or
partners. Moreover, binding Supreme Court precedent, ratified and expanded
by Congress in 1991, commits Title VII to the broader principle that employers
cannot prescribe non-merit-based gender roles on both men and women equal-
ly. The same idea has been uncontroversial with regard to race among lower
court judges.41
Third, at the same time Title VII was formally evolving, the Constitution's
treatment of LGBT persons has formally evolved. Between 1967 and 1996, au-
thoritative Supreme Court decisions advised Congress and state legislatures
that homosexual or bisexual persons could be treated as per se "afflicted with
psychopathic personality" and that private nonprocreative sexual acts between
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read The Federalist but Not Statutory Leg-
islative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1301 (1998).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-2(e) (2012).
41. See Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F-3d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 2008) ("[W]here an employee is sub-
jected to adverse action because an employer disapproves of interracial association, the em-
ployee suffers discrimination because of the employee's own race."); Parr v. Woodmen of the
World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (8th Cir. 1986) ("Where a plaintiff claims discrimina-
tion based upon an interracial marriage or association, he alleges, by definition, that he has
been discriminated against because of his race.").
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consenting same-sex couples could be criminalized as felonies.42 Psychopaths
and presumptive felons do not enjoy all the protections of a merit-based work-
place, an important reason for Congress's longstanding lack of interest in delib-
erating about any workplace rights for LGBT people. But, reflecting changes in
social attitudes and in medical and psychiatric views, the Court changed the
constitutional baseline in a series of landmark Fourteenth Amendment deci-
sions handed down between 1996 and 2015.4 This dramatically evolving con-
stitutional context upends the assumptions of the leading circuit court prece-
dents excluding "homosexuals" and "transsexuals" from the protections of
Title VII and further undermines the congressional acquiescence arguments
made by the Trump Administration's Justice Department in Zarda. That is, ju-
dicial precedents premised on the assumption that Congress and employers can
discriminate against gay and lesbian employees because they are presumptive
criminals or psychopaths not only can be but must be revisited once that pre-
sumption has not only been revoked but reversed.4 4
Part III pauses to summarize the lessons of our extensive investigation of
Title VII's statutory history. Looking forward, this Feature then addresses the
possibility that an ideologically driven but textualist Supreme Court no longer
effectively monitored by a gridlocked Congress will be tempted to impose an
anti-LGBT reading on a statutory text, structure, and history that strongly
support the plaintiffs' claims in Hively, Evans, and Zarda. The web of statutory
text, structure, precedent, practice, and constitutional background norms is so
tightly interconnected and strongly hostile to reading LGBT employees out of
the protections of Title VII's merit-based workplace that an effort by the Su-
preme Court to turn back the clock through a stingy reading of the statutory
text would probably be an embarrassment to original meaning jurisprudence.
Indeed, a poorly researched textual analysis, divorced from statutory history,
would amount to an assault on the rule of law itself. The predictability prom-
ised by the rule of law requires even the Supreme Court to respect the web of
interconnected rules and neutral principles that administrators have created,
judges have ratified or altered, and legislators have relied on when they revisit
the statute through amendments and overrides. As the Seventh Circuit recog-
42. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
43. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
44. Cf James McCauley Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213,
223-25 (1934) (defending nineteenth-century courts that updated precedents in light of new
statutory principles recognizing new rights for married women and for nonmarital chil-
dren).
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nized in Hively, that web of rules and neutral principles supports a simple di-
rective that Title VII's merit-based workplace protects LGBT individuals.
I. THE MERIT-BASED WORKPLACE AND THE MEANING OF TITLE VII
A. The Merit-Based Workplace
Start with the normative ideal of a merit-based workplace, where all people
would have and retain jobs based upon their ability to perform and would not
be excluded from jobs or harassed at work because of personal characteristics
irrelevant to their capabilities. This ideal is inspired by sociologist Max Weber's
contrast between a patriarchal culture, wherein economic and social structure
was organized around status and personalized around the father or master, and
modern culture, which seeks to organize production around objective, merito-
cratic rules, rather than subjective, caste-based practices.45 Under Weber's
framework, a merit-based workplace is axiomatic to the assumptions and prac-
tices of modern culture - and hence a highly desirable norm.
A wide range of modern normative philosophies would view the merit-
based workplace as a worthy ideal. For example, most utilitarian thinkers, seek-
ing the greatest good for the greatest number, would value such a workplace
because it allocates resources much more efficiently and promises to reduce dis-
ruptive workplace practices (like hazing and harassment).46 Many philosophers
of justice would endorse a merit-based workplace because it focuses evaluation
on the individual and establishes baselines that are fair and just, the kind of
rule that most of us would choose behind the veil of ignorance (i.e., we do not
know what entitlements we would have in a world following the rule).7
45. See 3 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 998-
1002 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1968).
46. The utility principle of the "greatest good for the greatest number" is associated with JOHN
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Bramwich & George Kateb eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003)
(1859). The related principle of maximizing total utility, regardless of the quality of good,
finds its classic articulation in JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Batoche Books 2000) (1781). For a modem exposition of utilitar-
ian views, see PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS (3d ed. 2011) (arguing for a form of utilitar-
ianism in which actions should maximally promote the preferences of those involved).
Though distinct from one another, these theories support the same basic notion: a work-
place run on merit is preferable because it maximizes good, the greatest kind of good, or the
preferences of the parties involved.
47. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 22-28 (1993) (describing the veil of ignorance); Paul
Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1, 48-52
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Finally, many civil rights advocates and theorists, including feminists,
would maintain that a genuine merit-based system would undermine the oper-
ation of prejudices and stereotypes that hold back women and minorities from
equal opportunities in the workplace.48 Their vision of a pluralistic workplace
is sometimes in tension with the utilitarian or economic vision, but as to many
issues they press in the same direction. I should note here that the merit-based
workplace is not a panacea, especially for inequities or discriminations faced by
persons who are poor or come from disadvantaged backgrounds. My only
point here is that such a norm enjoys support from a variety of perspectives
and fits the aspirations of our society.
The merit-based workplace norm is dynamic. A 1964 statute barring job
discrimination for reasons unrelated to people's capabilities would not immedi-
ately have been applied to protect "homosexual" employees, as there was a so-
cial consensus that "homosexuals" were not capable of doing most jobs due to
their inherent "psychopathic personality" and other mental disorders.4 9 In ad-
dition, every state but Illinois at that time considered "homosexuals" to be
criminals by reason of their characteristic sexual activity (consensual sodo-
my).so The same statutory language, read today, could protect gay people
against discrimination, because both social facts and the law have changed: it
can no longer seriously be maintained that homosexuality is evidence of psy-
chopathy or mental illness, and consensual sodomy can no longer be a crime
after Lawrence v. Texas.s" Indeed, a job discrimination law that authorized em-
ployers to discriminate against LGBT workers because of traditional stereo-
types would be constitutionally suspect under Romer v. Evans,5 2 in which the
(1976) (arguing that principles of fairness should avoid group classifications and instead fo-
cus on the individual as the relevant unit of ethical concern).
48. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A
CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979) (arguing that the modern workplace is premised not
on merit, but on conditions that perpetuate women's social and economic inequality); PREJ-
UDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986)
(reviewing the psychological literature on the complex motivational, cognitive, and social
factors that perpetuate prejudice and disadvantage minority groups in a variety of environ-
ments).
49. See Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 118 (1967) (holding that a bisexual Canadian was per se
"afflicted with psychopathic personality" disorder and therefore excludable from entry);
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 69
(1999).
50. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA, 1861-
2003, at 387-407 (2008) (documenting the evolution of consensual sodomy laws for each
state).
51. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
52. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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Supreme Court ruled that laws excluding gay, lesbian, and bisexual persons
from general legal protections without plausible justification (or because of an-
tigay animus) violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, on its face, legis-
lates the merit-based workplace as regards characteristics associated with race,
color, national origin, religion, and sex-precisely the modern Weberian ap-
proach, as limited to the enumerated traits, whose consideration is presump-
tively not consistent with workplace meritocracy. While some utilitarian think-
ers (including Judge Posner) argue that Title VII does not efficiently promote
this meritocratic ideal, others have endorsed its mission." (And of course
Judge Posner enthusiastically advanced Title VII's mission by his concurring
opinion in Hively.54 ) From most feminist perspectives, Title VII properly "seeks
to ... identify, and change, discriminatory employment practices that reinforce
negative stereotypes and foster unnecessary difference and division,
and ... [to] endorse practices that encourage people to relate to each other as
equals across boundaries of sex and race."" As Part II will demonstrate, the
statutory and legislative history of Title VII not only makes clear that the merit-
based workplace represented Congress's plan for the statute, but also elaborates
on the threats to that plan posed both by sexuality-based workplace discrimi-
nation and by gender stereotypes regarding the role of men and women in the
family, the workplace, and society.
Like the generic statute described at the beginning of this part, Title VII in
1964 would not have been applied to ensure a liberal workplace for "homosex-
uals" or "transsexuals," for those Americans were, literally, considered psycho-
paths, criminals, and enemies of the people-propositions that no longer enjoy
respectable support. The question in Hively and the other recent cases is
whether judges should interpret the current version of Title VII to include gay
and lesbian employees within the merit-based workplace. To answer that statu-
tory interpretation question, judges are supposed to consider (1) the text of the
statute, including the whole act and the statute's evolution through legislative
53. Compare John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411 (1986) (arguing
Title VII enhances efficiency), with Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title
VII, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 513 (1987) (considering the transaction costs in administering Title
VII).
54. See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F-3 d 339, 352-57 (Posner, J., concurring).
ss. Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENV. L. REV. 995, 1108-09 (2015)
(surveying the history of Title VII and synthesizing the relative consensus of feminist
groups and thinkers); accord Cary Franklin, Inventing the "Traditional Concept" of Sex Dis-
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amendments and repeals, (2) the legislative purpose, (3) Supreme Court prec-
edents authoritatively interpreting the statute, (4) the legislative deliberations
preceding and accompanying the enactment of the statute and its amendments,
(5) the regulatory history of the statute and how agency interpretations interact
with the legislative deliberations, and (6) larger constitutional, institutional,
and social norms.5 6
These standard legal sources ought to be applied with an eye to the purpos-
es of statutory interpretation as an operation of the government. Specifically,
the purposes of statutory interpretation are (1) ensuring the rule of law (pre-
dictable and consistent application of concrete legal authorities using an objec-
tive, transparent method of analysis), (2) in a manner that respects the legiti-
mate deliberation and actions of our democratically elected lawmakers, and (3)
that reasonably adapts statutes to the evolving governance needs of society. 7 In
Hively, Judge Posner lionized the third element, dominating the other two,"
but I (like Chief Judge Wood and Judge Sykes) maintain that dynamic judges
ought to pay close attention both to the operation of the democratic process
and the most concrete sources of statutory meaning, namely, statutory text,
structure, and precedent.
A central contention of this Feature is that the rule-of-law norms empha-
sized by Chief Judge Wood and Judges Flaum and Sykes complement rather
than conflict with the updating needs emphasized by Judge Posner. To accom-
plish this synthesis, I shall examine standard legal sources that were not ex-
plored in Hively or Evans -namely, those reflecting authoritative interpretation
and democratic deliberation. Subsequent congressional amendments, their leg-
islative purpose and history, and administrative and judicial precedents provide
democratic support for a synthesis of the approaches taken by Chief Judge
Wood and Judge Rosenbaum (dissenting in Evans).
B. Original Meaning of Title VII
In Hively, Judge Sykes relied upon a simpler approach to statutory interpre-
tation that has enjoyed enthusiastic support from many judges and some
scholars. Following Justice Scalia, Judge Sykes invoked the original meaning of
56. WiLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAw: A PRIMER ON How To READ STATUTES AND
THE CONSTITUTION 23-31 (2016); see id. at chs. 1-6 (describing each legitimate source for
statutory interpretation in separate chapters).
57. See id. at 16-20, 23-26 (explaining the normative purposes of statutory interpretation, as an
enterprise undergirding the modern administrative state).
58. See Hively, 853 F.3 d at 352-53 (Posner, J., concurring).
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the statutory text, which bars employer discrimination "because of sex."" Is she
right to say that the original meaning of this language requires faithful textual-
ist judges to dismiss Hively's claim? Several strict adherents of original mean-
ing jurisprudence -notably Judges Frank Easterbrook and Kenneth Ripple -
joined Chief Judge Wood's Hively opinion, which suggests that the original
meaning inquiry might not be so straightforward.
As enacted in 1964, Title VII did not define "sex." Federal judges often start
with standard dictionaries of the era to think about statutory meaning of un-
defined terms.60 Judge Sykes found that "sex" in 1964 had only one meaning-
the division of humanity into biological males and females. 1 Such a simple
understanding is incomplete, at best. The unabridged 1961 printing of Web-
ster's (the most-cited dictionary in Supreme Court opinions) defined the word
"sex" to mean three different things:
* " [o]ne of the two divisions of organisms formed on the distinction of
male and female," or sex as biology;
* "[t] he sphere of behavior dominated by the relations between male and
female," or sex as gender (man=masculine, woman= feminine);
* "the whole sphere of behavior related even indirectly to the sexual func-
tions and embracing all affectionate and pleasure-seeking conduct," or
sex as sexuality.6 2
Webster's was not alone in this broader array of ordinary meanings that were, in
1964, associated with the term "sex."63 Can it really be maintained then that
"sex" had but one meaning in 1964?
Consider a concrete example. In the 1960s, an increasing number of
schools had "sex education" programs. What topics might have been covered in
59. Hively, 853 F.3 d at 360-62 (7 th Cir. 2017) (Sykes, J., dissenting).
6o. E.g., Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Carter, 135 S. Ct. 1970, 1976
(2015); Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 56o, 566-69 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos,
561 U.S. 593, 603 (2o1o).
61. Hively, 853 F.3 d at 362 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
62. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2296 (2d una-
bridged ed. 1961); accord WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1963);
WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1963).
63. Another leading contemporary dictionary defined "sex" as "the sum of the anatomical and
physiological differences with reference to which the male and the female are distinguished,
or the phenomena depending on these differences. [sex as biology or gender] 3. the instinct or
attraction drawing one sex toward another, or its manifestation in life and conduct [sex as
sexuality or gender]." Sex, in THE AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY (Clarence L. Barnhart ed.,
1955); see also Sex, in FUNK & WAGNALLS STANDARD DICTIONARY (International ed. 1963)
(defining "sex" as "3. The character of being male or female [sex as gender] 4. The activity or
phenomena of life concerned with sexual desire or reproduction [sex as sexuality]").
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programs teaching about "sex"? According to Judge Sykes's definition, "sex ed-
ucation" would cover only sex as biology, teaching kids the morphological
differences between men and women. But might a sex education course also
teach about gender roles, either descriptively or prescriptively? And surely a sex
education course might teach about human sexuality-including variation in
sexual practices as well as the mechanics and norms relevant to reproductive
sex.
In fact, sex education courses of the 196os offered much more discussion
about gender roles and human sexuality than they did about the biological
differences between the sexes. 64 For example, the sex education curriculum fol-
lowed by many secondary schools in California asked students to engage in
role-playing exercises contrasting authority relations between husbands and
wives; high school students taclded "changing male and female roles" by dis-
cussing differing interpretations of masculinity, femininity, and differentiated
sex roles.65 As part of a ninth-grade unit on "sexual deviations," California's sex
education students learned that homosexuality "has been known throughout
human history and occurs in many societies." 66
The foregoing analysis suggests that the meaning of "sex" in 1964 was not
as one-dimensional as Judge Sykes asserted. Judge Sykes also maintained that
discrimination "because of sex" must mean something different than discrimi-
nation "because of sexual orientation." 67 That is a better argument, but has
Judge Sykes posed this question in a neutral manner? Chief Judge Wood posed
the textual question another way: What is the relationship of "discriminate be-
cause of sex" and "discriminate because of the sex of your spouse/partner"? Is
original meaning textualism nothing more than a clever shell game, where each
64. See JEFFREY P. MORAN, TEACHING SEX: THE SHAPING OF ADOLESCENCE IN THE 20TH CENTURY
172-77 (2000). For a close (and almost quaint) look at "sex education" materials predating
the 196os, see Lois PEMBERTON, THE STORK DIDN'T BRING YOU! (1948).
65. MORAN, supra note 64, at 175. Sex education materials emphasized this theme: "The female
of the species throughout all of nature is destined for motherhood." PEMBERTON, supra note
64, at 31. After an exhortation to not obsess about sex as sexuality, one instruction con-
cludes: "[Y]ou'll pick the right girl at the right time under the right circumstances; marry
her and establish your home." Id. at 57.
66. MORAN, supra note 64, at 176. The curriculum noted that "occasional sexual interest in oth-
ers of the same sex . .. frequently occur[s] in adolescents who do not become homosexuals
in adult life,' and suggested "adequate sex education of both parents and children, so that
the homosexual can understand himself better and the community can free itself of its puni-
tive attitudes toward all sexuality." Id. The "true homosexuals and lesbians" may need more
serious medical attention, but the mature teenager's first instinct should be to "stop calling
them 'fairies' or 'queers."' PEMBERTON, supra note 64, at 94.
67. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F-3d 3 3 9 , 362-65 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
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side can secure the "original meaning" it prefers by the way it poses the in-
quiry?
Stick with Judge Sykes's manner of posing the question. The honest textu-
alist still needs to explore the exact relationship of "discriminate because of sex"
and "discriminate because of sexual orientation." Do the two types of discrimi-
nation have no overlapping application, as Judge Sykes assumed? Might they
overlap (Judge Flaum's view)? Or might one kind of discrimination be a subset
of the other (Chief Judge Wood's perspective)? Overlapping or subsumed
terms are common in antidiscrimination law. Title VII bars discrimination be-
cause of skin color, nationality, and race-terms that overlap considerably.
Many state and municipal laws prohibit discrimination both because of sex and
because of pregnancy, even though the latter is widely accepted as a subset of
the former.6 8 Other state statutes, as well as Title VII today, explicitly define
"discriminate because of pregnancy" as a subset of "discriminate because of
sex."
69
As Judge Flaum argued, it is difficult to believe that an employer who ob-
jects to female employees because of the biological sex of their romantic part-
ners is not discriminating at least in part "because of sex" even if the statutory
term is understood only to entail sex as biology.70 As amended in 1991, Title
VII provides that an employer can violate the law in mixed-motive cases, so
long as one significant "motivating factor" is sex, even if "other factors also mo-
tivated the practice."" This is an example of how statutory interpretation can
be highly dynamic. Because of this and other amendments, Title VII means
something different today than it did when it was enacted in 1964-based upon
new statutory texts adopted by our democratically elected representatives.
Thus, even if Judge Sykes were right about the original 1964 meaning of "sex"
and its relationship to "sexual orientation," the 1991 amendment requires her to
demonstrate that "sex" is not even a motivating factor when an employer dis-
criminates against an employee because of the sex of her partner (or because of
68. See, for example, statutes prohibiting employment actions based on both sex and pregnan-
cy: UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A- 5-lo6 (Lexis Nexis 2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3900 (2001);
and Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-9-105 (2007). Statutes also prohibit discrimination on the basis
of sex and pregnancy in housing discrimination law, ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.200 (1987) and
in general civil rights statutes, 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-102 (2015).
69. Washington, D.C., D.C. CODE S 2-1401.01 (2007), and New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5
(West 2010), prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sex, but the statutes else-
where define pregnancy as a subset of sex or familial/marital status. Accord 42 U.S.C.
§ 20ooe(k) (2012) (added in 1978) (defining "discriminate because of sex" to include preg-
nancy-based discriminations).
70. Hively, 853 F.3 d at 357-59 (Flaum, J., concurring).
71. 42U.S.C. § 20ooe-2(m) (2012) (added 1991).
340
127._322 2017
THE SEX DISCRIMINATION ARGUMENT FOR LGBT WORKPLACE PROTECTIONS
her sex, in light of the partner's sex). For this reason, Judges Flaum and Ripple
emerge as the most faithful agents of a strictly textual meaning for Title VII.
C. Dynamic Title VII
Because she ignored most of the relevant statutory text and imposed arbi-
trary, unhistorical choices on the text she did analyze, the application of Judge
Sykes's approach is just as "judge-empowering" as Judge Posner's openly dy-
namic approach. The challenge for both judges would be to demonstrate that
their creative readings of Title VII rested upon legitimate reasoning from legal
authority and relevant facts about the world. Setting aside his earlier criticisms
of Title VII, Judge Posner argued that judges ought to expand the merit-based
workplace to include lesbian and gay employees, based upon current
knowledge about these employees.72 Judge Sykes, in contrast, was reluctant to
apply the statute to create new liabilities for employers without more explicit
guidance from Congress, which has repeatedly failed to act upon bills to bar
workplace discrimination based on sexual orientation (and, recently, gender
identity)." Both Judge Posner and Judge Sykes would have written more per-
suasive legal opinions if they had been attentive to what Congress actually did
when it enacted the law in 1964 and when it subsequently amended the law or
adopted related statutes. In my view, what Congress actually does -the point of
statutory history-is more important than what Congress fails to do -the point
of Judge Sykes's and the Justice Department's neglected proposals argument.
(Indeed, strict textualists are committed to following the original meaning of
the words Congress actually enacted -not words that it later failed to enact -
and have rejected the idea that a subsequent Congress can tell us the original
meaning of a previously enacted statute.74 )
Authoritative judicial interpretations of the governing statute are another
inevitably dynamic source in statutory interpretation; those interpretations will
affect the path taken by the statute. In Hively, neither Judge Posner nor Judge
Sykes applied Supreme Court Title VII precedents with notable enthusiasm, an
attitude at odds with the hierarchical structure of the federal judiciary and,
72. Hively, 853 F.3 d at 354-57 (Posner, J., concurring).
73. See id. at 373 (Sykes, J., dissenting); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note
29, at Attachment A (listing sixty-two bills introduced in Congress between 1975 and 2017
that would have barred discrimination because of sexual orientation or perceived sexual ori-
entation).
74. See, e.g., Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 240-43 (2011); Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614,
626-27 (2004); Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 170 (2001);
Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 628-29 n.8 (1990).
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often, with the rule of law itself." Lower court judges are expected to treat Su-
preme Court precedents seriously -and should typically follow them faithfully
and not begrudgingly. While ambiguous Supreme Court precedents will inevi-
tably be applied dynamically by lower court judges,76 these lower court judges
have an obligation to justify their views that Supreme Court precedents offer
them no clear guidance. In my view, such a justification requires judicial atten-
tion to legislative deliberations about the statutory purpose(s).
In the end, I believe that the methodological debate between original mean-
ing (Judge Sykes) and dynamic interpretation (Judge Posner) has little to do
with the proper interpretation of Title VII. A statute - like Title VII - that has
been authoritatively interpreted, amended by Congress on several occasions,
and then reinterpreted is a statute where original meaning itself is a dynamic
process and involves updating. The clashing interpretations in Hively cannot be
legally evaluated without understanding the formal evolution of Title VII-
from its enactment in 1964, through its amendment in 1972, continuing with
the congressional override of the Supreme Court's pregnancy discrimination
decision in 1978, referencing the EEOC's application of Title VII to sexual har-
assment and the Supreme Court's and Congress's ratification of that applica-
tion, emphasizing the Supreme Court's landmark decision holding that work-
place exclusions based on gender stereotypes can violate the statute, exploring
Congress's ratification and expansion of this norm in the 1991 Amendments,
and finally, including the Family and Medical Leave Act in 1993. To that evolu-
tion I now turn.
II. THE THREE FACES OF DISCRIMINATION "BECAUSE OF SEX":
ENSURING A MERIT-BASED WORKPLACE
In surveying the statutory history of Title VII, I shall apply each of the
three meanings that "sex" had in 1964 and, in the process, more deeply explore
how those meanings are interrelated. The statutory history establishes, as a
matter of relatively settled law, that Title VII guarantees individual employees a
merit-based workplace where their opportunities will not be impeded by their
biological sex (or that of their intimate associates), descriptive or prescriptive
gender stereotyping, or sexualized harassment.
The statutory history is highly relevant to all the judges considering the
Hively/Evans/Zarda issue. Contrary to Judge Sykes and the Trump Administra-
tion, Title VII is not simply class-based legislation, aimed only at employer pol-
75. U.S. CONsT. art. III, S 1; id. art. VI.
76. Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921 (2016).
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icies or workplace conditions that disfavor women and favor men, or disfavor
blacks and favor whites, or disfavor Catholics and favor Protestants. Instead, as
stated by its text and entrenched by its statutory history, Title VII operates as
classification-based legislation, aimed at employer policies or workplace condi-
tions that disadvantage any employee because of her or his race, sex, or reli-
gion-including the race, sex, or religion of her or his intimate associates.
(These classifications have traditionally burdened blacks, women, and Catho-
lics more than whites, men, and Protestants, but the statutory command also
protects whites, men, and Protestants against improper discrimination.) The
statutory history also makes clear that "because of sex" has a broad meaning
that includes gender and sexuality as well as biological sex. Finally, the history
supports my intuition that you cannot linguistically or conceptually separate
biology, gender, and sexuality when talking about "sex." Workplace rules that
arbitrarily exclude or disable employees because of their race, sex, or religion
are suspect under Title VII, even when they apply to whites as well as blacks,
men as well as women, Catholics as well as Protestants, and gays as well as
straights.
Title VII's statutory history has created a web of interconnected rules and
principles that have been responsive to emerging facts about what undermines
the possibility of a merit-based workplace for all employees - the pervasiveness
and toxicity of sexual harassment is one example, and the falsity of antigay ste-
reotypes is another. As administrators, judges, and legislators have responded
to our evolving understanding of the workplace, they have crafted a series of
legal rules and precedents that render the exclusion of LGBT employees from
Title VII increasingly anomalous and profoundly unworkable. In light of the
Supreme Court's recent Fourteenth Amendment precedents, the blanket exclu-
sion is constitutionally problematic as well.
The materials that follow provide some interesting arguments that might
enrich the approaches of Judges Sykes and Posner. As you read the statutory
history, consider the important role Congress has played in updating the stat-
ute (an idea that gives Judge Sykes some ammunition), but also the ways in
which Title VII jurisprudence has worked itself into a hopeless muddle if inter-
preted to exclude sexual orientation claims (a practicality that supports Judge
Posner). On the whole, Title VII's statutory history suggests that the opinions
of Chief Judge Wood and Judge Rosenbaum, read together, provide a way for-
ward consistent with the rule of law.
A. Sex as Biology: Relational Discrimination
Chief Judge Wood's formal argumentation assumed that women and men
are separate biological sexes and reasoned that discriminating against a woman
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(like Hively) because she is romantically involved with another woman is dis-
crimination "because of .. . sex." Recall that two different kinds of arguments
flow from this proposition. The first is the comparator argument: if Hively had
been a man (the sex-based comparator), she would not have been discriminat-
ed against, because Ivy Tech would not have excluded men romantically in-
volved with women. "But for" Professor Hively's sex, she would not have been
excluded from consideration by the college."
The second kind of argument, which Chief Judge Wood also offered,
points to associational discrimination based on Loving v. Virginia" and, implic-
itly, McLaughlin v. Florida." In the South as late as the 196os, different-race
couples were subject to special penalties for marriage (Loving) and sexual co-
habitation (McLaughlin) not applicable to same-race couples. In both cases, the
Supreme Court treated the state rules as discrimination because of race.so Chief
Judge Wood read Loving (and I read McLaughlin) for the idea that discrimina-
tion because of one's association with a person of a different race is a cognizable
form of discrimination. By analogy to Loving, Hively was discriminated against
because of her romantic association with someone of the same sex. As Andrew
Koppelman has long argued, "If a business fires Ricky, or if the state prosecutes
him, because of his sexual activities with Fred, while these actions would not be
taken against Lucy if she did exactly the same things with Fred, then Ricky is
being discriminated against because of his sex.""
Notice that both the comparator point and the analogy to Loving and
McLaughlin are standard original meaning arguments: they are both linked to
the original text of Title VII as enacted and amended by Congress. Handed
down shortly after Congress adopted Title VII, McLaughlin was the leading
Supreme Court case on this issue in 1964. Loving was the leading case when
Congress expanded Title VII in the 1972 Amendments. (Unlike the Depart-
ment of Justice and Judge Sykes, I am not relying on circuit court decisions;
77. In sex discrimination cases, the Supreme Court has applied a "simple test of whether the
evidence shows 'treatment of a person in a manner which but for that person's sex would be
different"' to determine whether a sex-based violation of Title VII occurred. City of L.A.
Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978) (quoting Developments in the
Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 1109, 1170 (1971)).
78. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding unconstitutional state laws barring different-race marriages).
79. 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (holding unconstitutional state laws treating different-race cohabitation
more harshly than same-sex cohabitation).
80. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11-12; McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 196.
81. Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination,
69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197,208 (1994).
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Supreme Court decisions are the authoritative final interpretations of the Con-
stitution and federal statutes, of which Congress is presumed to be aware and
in fact does follow fairly carefully.82 ) To say that members of the 1964 Congress
themselves would not have drawn the conclusions Chief Judge Wood draws
from this text is the sort of counterfactual speculation that discredited the
"original intent" arguments made against Loving." As a matter of original legal
meaning, firing a white employee dating a black woman because of prejudice
against "racial mixing" would have been discrimination "because of race" in
1964 and in 1972. In parallel fashion, why then would it not be discrimination
"because of sex" to fire a female employee because she is dating a woman?
Judge Flaum's concurring opinion treats the comparator argument and the
associational discrimination argument as more or less the same claim.84 I find
Chief Judge Wood's separate analysis useful, but -inspired by Judge Flaum -I
should like to link both of her arguments with the concept of relational discrim-
ination. Relational discrimination refers to adverse treatment of an individual
because of her relationship to others; relational discrimination because of a
regulated trait (race, ethnicity, religion, sex) refers to adverse treatment where
that relational trait is the variable that determines who is discriminated
against." An employer's discrimination against a white woman married to a
black man is relational discrimination because of race - either the race of the
woman (white) or of her spouse (black) or, best conceived, the relationship or
interaction between the two. Likewise, discrimination against Kimberly Hively
because she was romantically attracted to women rather than men was rela-
tional discrimination because of sex-Hively's sex or her partner's sex or, best,
the relationship or interaction between the two.
Notice that relational discrimination disrupts the narrative that Judge Sykes
and the Trump Administration's Department of Justice offer for their view that
82. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101
YALE L.J. 331, 336-41, 415-16 (1991) (demonstrating that about half of the Supreme Court's
statutory interpretations generated formal hearings in Congress, which overrode many of
them-in contrast to circuit court decisions, which Congress almost never makes the occa-
sion for formal hearings and almost never overrides).
83. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Andrea Matthews, Originalism and Loving v. Virginia, 2012
BYU L. REv. 1393, 1437-63; see also Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and
Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 35-42 (2011) (discussing the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
84. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F-3 d 339, 357-58 ( 7 th Cir. 2017) (Flaum, J., con-
curring). See generally K oppelman, supra note 81 (discussing different theories under which
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation qualifies as sex discrimination).
85. Victoria Schwartz, Title VII: A Shift from Sex to Relationships, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 209,
213-14 (2012).
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"because of sex" cannot be read literally (Hively would have been treated
differently if she had been a man who loved women) or cannot be read to mean
"because of the sex of her partner." By their account, antigay employment poli-
cies or practices do not violate Title VII because they involve "differential
treatment of gay and straight employees for men and women alike."86 Their as-
sumption is that discrimination because of sex must affect men or women in
different ways. The text of Title VII, however, is inconsistent with that view;
Section 703 does not announce protected "classes" of employees but, instead,
sets forth status-based "classifications" (race, sex, etc.) that cannot be the basis
for workplace discrimination. A classification-based approach can apply equally
to all classes, in contrast to the class-based approach hypothesized by Judge
Sykes and the Trump Administration- without citing a single provision of Ti-
tle VII. For example, it would violate Title VII for a secular business to hire on-
ly Roman Catholics, but it would also be a violation for the secular business to
refuse to hire employees who say they are religious but who do not attend reli-
gious services every week. The latter policy affects Catholics and Protestants
the same way, but that does not protect it from the merit-based rules of Title
VII. The same point, of course, can be made about Loving and McLaughlin: the
state policies affected white people and people of color the same way, but they
still represented unconstitutional discrimination because of race.
Consistent with this text and with the analogy to Loving, the original mean-
ing of Title VII is that antimiscegenation employment policies violate Title VII,
even though they do not involve "differential treatment" for black and white
employees (who are treated alike by the employer who does not tolerate inter-
racial intimacy). The Justice Department and Judge Sykes can escape the Lov-
ing analogy only by claiming that discrimination because of sex is less im-
portant than or has a different structure than discrimination because of race or
discrimination because of religion for that matter. Like their other arguments,
they cite no statutory text for this proposition. What is the point of original
meaning textualism when its adherents ignore statutory text that cuts against
their desired result or argumentation?
Moreover, the Trump Administration and Judge Sykes's special treatment
of sex discrimination is inconsistent with the statutory history of Title VII.
After public debate and statutory amendments, Title VII targets sex discrimi-
nation with as much force and in the same way it targets race discrimination.
That includes relational discrimination because of either sex or race (or reli-
gion).
346
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1. The Early History of Title VII and the 1972 Amendments
Administrators and judges were slow to apply Title VII's sex discrimination
bar vigorously, in part because they believed the primary statutory mission to
be eradication of race-based discrimination and did not think Congress ex-
pected them to dislodge traditional gender roles or, perhaps, to do much about
workplace sex discrimination at all.17 Indeed, many considered the sex discrim-
ination amendment to Title VII to have been either a joke or a subterfuge plot-
ted by its sponsor, Representative Howard Smith, a well-known foe of racial
integration but in fact also a close ally of the women's rights movement." As
scholars have documented, the joke or subterfuge reading of the sex discrimi-
nation amendment is greatly exaggerated, at the very least." Nonetheless, for
some years it had traction as a reason or an excuse for decisionmakers to read
the sex discrimination bar to be much narrower than the race discrimination
bar. Under such circumstances, the Loving analogy would have been a much
less persuasive argument.
After the EEOC initially took the absurd position that employers could
openly advertise jobs in a sex-segregated manner, female activists and lawyers
from various perspectives created an umbrella group, the National Organiza-
tion for Women (NOW), specifically to resist the EEOC's narrow view of sex
discrimination.o More faithful text-based decisions from agencies as well as
courts followed that feminist educational and political effort. In its first Title
VII sex-discrimination case, Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corporation, decided in
1971, the Supreme Court unanimously overturned an employer policy refusing
to employ women (but not men) with pre-school-age children.91 The unani-
mous Court reasoned that Title VII enforced a merit-based workplace by refer-
ence to classifications, not classes. "Section 703 (a) of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 requires that persons of like qualifications be given employment opportu-
nities irrespective of their sex."92 Moreover, it is apparent that the employer was
87. Franklin, supra note 55, at 1336-39.
88. See generally Schultz, supra note 55, at 1014-22 (discussing " [t]he storied enactment of the sex
amendment as a joke").
89. The "joke" interpretation of the House amendment adding "sex" to Title VII is thoroughly
examined and debunked in CYNTHIA HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX: THE POLITICS OF
WOMEN'S ISSUES, 1945-1968, at 176-82 (1988) and Rachel Osterman, Origins of a Myth: Why
Courts, Scholars, and the Public Think Title VII's Ban on Sex Discrimination Was an Accident, 20
YALEJ.L. &FEMINISM 409 (2009).
go. Schultz, supra note 55, at 1028-32.
91. 4oo U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
92. Id. at 544.
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not discriminating exclusively based upon sex as biology, as 75-80% of those
hired were women. Instead, the employer was primarily discriminating because
of sex as gender role (women like Ida Phillips should be at home tending the
kids) and even sex as sexuality (women with children were presumably sexual-
ly active). Thus, from the very first Supreme Court interpretation, discrimina-
tion because of sex had a broader meaning than Judge Sykes supposed.
After extensive hearings and floor debate, Congress in the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act of 1972 extended Title VII to apply to federal, state, and
local government employees and expanded the EEOC's enforcement authori-
ty.9' Because Congress extended Title VII's application to state employees un-
der the authority of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has ruled
that Congress acted to rectify unconstitutional state sex discrimination, such as
longstanding rules barring female employees from job opportunities, and sure-
ly including the gender-stereotyping rule struck down the year before in Martin
Marietta.94 Such an assumption is amply supported by the congressional delib-
erations, which show that the drafters of the Act agreed with NOW and other
groups that the workplace needed to be open to all workers, regardless of sex,
and that state and local governments were pervasively violating that norm. The
committee reports endorsed the approach to Title VII advanced by NOW and
(by 1972) the EEOC: sex discrimination "is no less serious than other prohibit-
ed forms of discrimination," including race discrimination.9 s The reports fur-
ther stated that the EEOC and the courts should make every effort to enforce
the sex discrimination bar vigorously.96 Support for progressive views on the
statutory sex discrimination ban and a stronger EEOC found voice in both con-
93. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
94. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (upholding application of Title VII to state sex dis-
crimination and ruling that the state has no Eleventh Amendment defense, as it has been
overridden by Congress acting under its Fourteenth Amendment powers); see also Nev.
Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 729-30 (2003) (upholding the application of the
Family and Medical Leave Act to state employers, based in part on a discussion of the origi-
nal purposes of Title VII). On pervasive and unconstitutional state discrimination against
LGBT employees, see H.R. 3017, Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2oo9: Hearing on
H.R. 3017 Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, iith Cong. (2009) (presenting extensive
evidence of state discrimination that would probably violate the Constitution).
95. S. REP. No. 92-415, at 7 (1971); accord Equal Employment Opportunities EnforcementAct: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the S. Comm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 91st Cong. 194,
201 (1969) (statements by professional women's federations); H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 4-5
(1972).
96. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 3 (1971) ("It is essential that ... effective enforcement
procedures be provided [to] the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to strengthen
its efforts to reduce discrimination in employment.").
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temporary feminist scholars" and members of Congress in public delibera-
tion.98 After the 1972 Amendments, which repeatedly equated the evils of sex
discrimination with those of race discrimination, the Loving analogy becomes
much more cogent. Indeed, 1972 is a key moment for that argument in another
way.
The same year that Congress invoked its authority to enforce constitutional
equality guarantees in the 1972 Amendments to Title VII, it passed the Equal
Rights Amendment (ERA) by overwhelming majorities and sent it to the states
for ratification. The ERA would have amended the Constitution to prohibit
government discrimination "on account of sex," similar to the Title VII lan-
guage. A major concern with the ERA was the associational discrimination
point, raised in 1970 congressional testimony by Paul Freund of Harvard Law
School. Applying the logic of Loving, Professor Freund argued that for the same
reason that denying different-race couples marriage licenses constitutes dis-
crimination because of race (and is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment), denying same-sex couples marriage licenses would be discrimi-
nation because of sex (and thus probably unconstitutional under the ERA)."
Citing Freund's testimony, ERA opponent Senator Sam Ervin introduced
an amendment to the ERA: " [The ERA] shall not apply to any law prohibiting
sexual activity between persons of the same sex or the marriage of persons of
97. See, e.g., Pauli Murray & Mary 0. Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and
Title V1l, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 232, 253 (1965) (arguing that the "trend" of employment
law was "away from sex distinctions in labor standards legislation and towards recognition
of governmental responsibility in providing equality of opportunity").
g8. See, e.g., 118 CONG. REc. 4,817 (1972) (statement of Sen. Stevenson) (noting that "one of the
broad mandates given to the newly established Equal Employment Opportunities Commis-
sion was to end discrimination in employment based on sex,' but the "presently weak
EEOC" had failed to effectively enforce this end); 117 CONG. REc. 31,975 (1971) (statement
of Rep. Drinan) (criticizing the weakness of the EEOC against a "background of widespread
discrimination" in which the "disgrace of discrimination against women" remained perva-
sive despite Title VII).
99. "Indeed, if the law must be as undiscriminating concerning sex as it is toward race, it would
follow that laws outlawing wedlock between members of the same sex would be as invalid
as laws forbidding miscegenation." Equal Rights 197o: Hearing on S.J. Res. 61 and S.J. Res. 231
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 74-75 (1970) (statement of Paul Freund, Pro-
fessor, Harvard Law School); accord Equal Rights for Men and Women 1971: Hearing on H.J.
Res. 35, 2o8, and Related Bills and H.R. 916 and Related Bills Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. (1971) (including ERA critics invoking Freund's 1970
Senate testimony repeatedly); Paul A. Freund, The Equal Rights Amendment Is Not the Way, 6
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 234 (1971) (asserting that the proposed Equal Rights Amendment
would likely implicate same-sex marriage); Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82
YALE L.J. 573, 574 (1973) (similar).
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the same sex." 0 0 Senator Birch Bayh, the ERA's floor manager, opposed the
Ervin Amendment because "the concern legitimate at first blush dissipates and
indeed disappears in toto."'0 The Senate rejected the Ervin Amendment. We
cannot know the precise reasons various senators had in mind when they voted
against the Ervin Amendment, but the public record does demonstrate that
Congress was on notice that the nation's leading authority on the Constitution
(Professor Freund) believed that the legal meaning of discrimination "on ac-
count of sex" carried with it the relational discrimination meaning established
by Loving. And at the same time Congress was amending Title VII in 1972, it
was aware of precise language that could be used to head off the application of
Loving to protect same-sex couples and "homosexual" employees.
Like Senator Ervin, ERA ratification opponents, ambivalent state legisla-
tors, and many engaged voters agreed with Professor Freund's argument. Phyl-
lis Schlafly, the founder of STOP ERA, made this argument a key part of her
successful campaign to slow down and ultimately prevent the ERA from secur-
ing the needed ratification from 38 state legislatures.102 Consider the STOP
ERA cartoon below. As you study the cartoon, notice how Mrs. Schlafly under-
stood "on account of sex" mainly in terms of sex as gender and sex as sexuality.
Implicitly, the cartoon's baseline is that sex as biology, sex as gender, and sex as
100. 118 CONG. REC. 9,314 (1972); see also Andrew Koppelman, Note, The Miscegenation Analogy:
Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145 (1988) (arguing that sodomy laws, like
miscegenation laws, violate equal protection because they "support a regime of caste that
locks some people into inferior social positions at birth").
101. 118 CONG. REC. 9,320 (1972).
102. See PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY, THE POWER OF THE POSITIVE WOMAN (1977); Phyllis Schlafly, ERA
and Homosexual "Marriages," PHYLLIS SCHIAFLY REP., Sept. 1974, at 3 (arguing that the Equal
Rights Amendment would grant "marriage licenses to homosexual couples who satisfy rea-
sonable and non-discriminatory qualifications"); Gillian Frank, Phyllis Schlafly's Legacy of
Anti-Gay Activism, SLATE (Sept. 6, 2016, 5:52 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward
/2o16/o9/o6/phyllisschlafly s_1egacy of anti-gayactivism.html [http://perma.cc
/U6XP-6UB9]; see also Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and
Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1393-1403 (20o6)
(documenting the exquisite dilemma Schlafly's arguments posed for feminists supporting
the ERA but sympathetic to some of the consequences she was attacking); Emily Germanis,
Amendment Now Needs Only Four More States: Mississippi Opponents Label It "Evil" Rights, Bi-
LOXI SUN HERALD, Feb. 15, 1975, at A-4 (stating that Mississippi women "oppose fully" the
ERA); Douglas Kneeland, Amendment Now Needs Only Four More States: Missouri Proponents
Elicit White House, BILOXI SUN HERALD, Feb. 15, 1975, at A-4 (noting that "Fundamentalist
Protestants and Roman Catholics" have "decided that the amendment would clear the way
for everything from totally unrestricted abortions to homosexual marriages to sexually inte-
grated public restrooms"); Martha Weinman Lear, Fear Holds More Clout than Fact in ERA
Fight, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 19, 1976, § 3, at 2 (reporting that STOP ERA and other groups ar-
gued that the ERA would make "homosexual marriages legalized").
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sexuality are normatively interrelated. Fated by biology, women's role is to bear
and rear the marital children, whose well-being is thwarted by a strict rule
against sex discrimination, for such a rule would generate "homosexual mar-
riages and adoption" and a culture of "abortion on demand." The cartoon is
roughly contemporaneous with the 1972 Amendments to the 1964 Act. Is it
completely clear, as Judge Sykes maintained, that no one would have under-
stood a rule against discrimination "because of sex" to secure rights for gay
people?
Due in part to Mrs. Schlafly's efforts and popular receptiveness to her ar-
guments, state ratifications slowed to a triclde after 1973-and a new ally en-
sured that STOP ERA would not prevail in the states that had not yet ratified.
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS) came out against the
ERA in January 1975, on the eve of a vote in the Utah Legislature (which swift-
ly rejected the ERA). Like STOP ERA, the LDS Church found the Loving anal-
ogy a persuasive reason to reject the ERA.
FIGURE 1.
STOP ERA'S INTERPRETATION OF DISCRIMINATION "ON ACCOUNT OF SEX" 103
2he- EA TROJAN HORSE IS PLJLLOF ABOMINATIONS...
4 R0M09XVMAL Z ARR4G SUN e Z ss
-~ 4MO5XUALARRM~S STATE4NU2ERIES SO
A4LL MOTHERG CAN
M OIN THE WORK' FORCE.
XVEAIO I -
Thus, the LDS leadership expressed grave concern that "passage of the
ERA could extend legal protection to same-sex lesbian and homosexual mar-
103. Frank, supra note 102.
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riages, giving legal sanction to the rearing of children in such homes."104 Be-
cause the ERA barred any state discrimination "on account of sex," it might bar
a state from denying marriage licenses to all-male or all-female couples. LDS
opposition through massive grass-roots activism by Mormon congregants was
critical to defeating the ERA in the period after January 1975-10
In short, the Loving analogy accepted by the Seventh Circuit in Hively has
longstanding historical roots that might have been known to the Congress that
adopted the 1964 Act (McLaughlin would be decided later that year) and would
surely have been known to the Congress that passed the 1972 Amendments
(the same Congress that passed the ERA). In any event, as a matter of statutory
interpretation doctrine, the Supreme Court routinely "attributes" to Congress
"knowledge" of widely recognized legal parallels and terms of art. 106
To be sure, the Supreme Court in the 1970s would not have ruled that Title
VII protected gay employees against discharge - not because the Loving analogy
was illogical, but because so few LGBT employees were out of the closet at
work and the employees who were "out" (or whose gender-bending appear-
ance and behavior made them "stand out") were widely considered sick, de-
praved, conspiratorial, disturbing, and even criminal. Thus, the Court could
easily have agreed with discriminatory employers that being straight, or at least
hiding in the closet (don't ask, don't tell), was a bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation under Title VII.10 ' At the very least, the issue was not ripe for Supreme
Court resolution. Indeed, right before the states started to debate the ERA, the
Supreme Court summarily refused to consider the Loving analogy as a constitu-
tional matter in its first same-sex marriage case. 0 s
104. The Church and the Proposed Equal Rights Amendment: A Moral Issue, ENSIGN (Feb. 1980),
http://www.ds.org/ensign/1980/o3/the-church-and-the-proposed-equal-rights
-amendment-a-moral-issue [http://perma.cc/CV7G-VULH].
105. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Latter-Day Constitutionalism: Sexuality, Gender, and Mormons,
2016 U. ILL. L. REv. 1227, 1234-35; D. Michael Quinn, The LDS Church's Campaign Against the
Equal Rights Amendment, 20 J. MORMON HIST. 85 (1994); Neil J. Young, "The ERA Is a Mor-
al Issue": The Mormon Church, LDS Women, and the Defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment, 59
AM. Q. 623 (2007).
io6. See, e.g., FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 291-92 (2012); Molzofv. United States, 502 U.S. 301,
307 (1992).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-2(e) (2012) (allowing employers to discriminate because of sex when sex
is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) for the job in question).
io8. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (summarily dismissing appeal for want of a substantial
federal question), overruled by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015); Appellants'
Jurisdictional Statement at 11, Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (No. 71-1027) (arguing
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During the ERA debate of the 1970s, a few lower courts went further. In
Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., the Fifth Circuit ruled that an employer
could discriminate against a man because he was "effeminate."' 09 The court
rested its reasoning on the premise that Congress only intended to guarantee
equal job opportunities to men and women and so did not intend to protect
employees whose gender traits did not perfectly match their employers' expec-
tations. 10 In Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., the Fifth Circuit, in dicta, cited Smith to
opine that "discharge for homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII." 1 ' A
handful of lower court opinions in the 1970s also held that Title VII provided
no relief for transgender employees discriminated against because of their as-
serted sex.112
2. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978
Another reason the Loving analogy would not have succeeded in the 1970s
is that the Supreme Court remained unwilling to apply Title VII's sex discrimi-
nation bar as seriously as it applied the race discrimination bar. In General Elec-
tric Co. v. Gilbert,"' the Court interpreted Title VII to allow employers to ex-
clude pregnancy benefits from their health care and disability insurance. Even
though the pregnancy exclusion only affected female employees, the Court held
that the policy was not disparate treatment because of sex. Central to the
Court's reasoning was its earlier interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause
to allow states to exclude pregnancy benefits from state disability plans; in both
Gilbert and the earlier constitutional precedent, the Court held that it is not dis-
crimination because of sex unless the policy treats women differently from sim-
ilarly situated men.114 The Court seemed to believe that there were no male
comparators to pregnant women -and the Court explicitly stated that denying
pregnancy benefits is not discrimination because of sex, as "traditionally" un-
og. 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978).
110. Id. at 327.
111. 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that a Jewish homosexual could be discharged for
using the employer's telephone during work hours for his private business, with dicta quot-
ed in text); accord DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 ( 9 th Cir. 1979).
112. See Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9 th Cir. 1977); accord Hamm
v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 158 (7 th Cir. 2003); Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742
F.2d 1081 ( 7 th Cir. 1984).
113. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
114. Id. at 136 (relying on Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) for the proposition that discrimi-
nation because of pregnancy means something different than discrimination because of sex,
in part because it does not treat all women differently from all men).
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derstood (and as the Court had previously ruled in the constitutional case)."'
Because the statute put men and nonpregnant women in one category, and
pregnant women in the other, the exclusion was not, strictly speaking, "because
of sex."116 Denying women Title VII protection because only a subgroup of
women were disadvantaged, the Court thus took a narrow view of the statutory
purpose. The Court also held that the policy was not unlawful disparate impact
discrimination, even though any policy with such a strong and exclusive impact
on employees of color would surely have been invalidated."'
The Gilbert approach might offer a counter to Chief Judge Wood's formalist
argumentation: Ivy Tech was not discriminating against women as a class, and
many people in the 1970s believed that homosexuality was the result of chosen
behavior rather than an immutable characteristic of one's biological sex. There
is an echo of this approach in Judge Sykes's Hively dissent" and in Judge
Pryor's concurring opinion in Evans` -but this approach is inconsistent with
the statute as written in 1964 and as amended in 1972 and 1978.
Responding strongly to Gilbert's result and reasoning, women's groups took
their case to Congress -which thoroughly repudiated Gilbert in the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA). 12 0 The congressional bipartisan super-
coalition that supported the PDA repeatedly expressed the view that Gilbert was
not only wrongly decided, but also completely misguided in its reasoning and
approach to sex discrimination. "By concluding that pregnancy discrimination
is not sex discrimination within the meaning of title VII, the Supreme Court
disregarded the intent of Congress in enacting title VII. That intent was to pro-
tect all individuals from unjust employment discrimination, including preg-
nant women."12 1 The PDA added pregnancy and related medical conditions to
115. Id. at 145-46 (drawing from the Court's reasoning in Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549
(1974) and Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 193 (1922)).
116. See id. at 134.
117. Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (invalidating a testing policy that had a
disparate impact on black employees).
118. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F-3 d 339, 373 ( 7 th Cir. 2017) (Sykes, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that if Ivy Tech hypothetically hired six women, this alone might be disposi-
tive of Hively's sex discrimination claim).
ig. Evans v. Ga. Reg'l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1258-59 (11th Cir. 2017) (Pryor, J., concurring)
(emphasizing that Jameka Evans was discriminated against because of her chosen "behav-
ior," and not her sex-based "status" and noting that many gay and lesbian people choose to
enter "mixed-orientation marriages,' namely, to persons of the opposite sex).
120. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe(k) (2012)).
121. Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy, 1977: Hearing on S. 995 Before the Subcomm. on Labor
of the S. Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 9 5 th Cong. 1 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 Hearings]
(statement of Sen. Harrison Williams, Chairman, S. Comm. on Labor & Human Res.); ac-
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Title VII's definition of "sex" and further provided: "women affected by preg-
nancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe bene-
fit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inabil-
ity to work." 12 2
The italicized text embodies the regulatory philosophy animating the 1964
Act and the 1972 Amendments, as well as the angry 1978 override. The govern-
ing principle is the merit-based workplace, where "ability or inability to work"
is the appropriate criterion, and where sex-based exclusions are disallowed or
must be justified by the legitimate needs of the business. Reflecting the ability-
to-work approach to sex discrimination evident in Congress's deliberations in
1977-78, Supreme Court decisions since the PDA have generally interpreted Ti-
tle VII (as amended) to cover any kind of sex-based classification, including
those affecting only a small percentage of women or men in the workplace. 123
Enactment of the PDA provided the occasion for the Supreme Court to ap-
ply Title VII to a matter of relational discrimination. In guidance to employers
soon after the PDA took effect, the EEOC opined that health and medical in-
surance policies could no longer deny pregnancy benefits to spouses of employ-
ees, as well as to employees themselves. 124 This guidance targeting relational
discrimination could have been justified by the same kinds of associational dis-
crimination or comparator arguments that Chief Judge Wood invoked in Hive-
ly. Female employees married to men received pregnancy benefits as part of
their family health insurance, but male employees married to women did not.
As a formal matter, the sex of the employee (the comparator argument) or of
the spouse (the associational discrimination argument) is what triggered
different treatment. Employers objected that relational discrimination such as
this was beyond the coverage of Title VII, even after the PDA.
cord Legislation To Prohibit Sex Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy: Hearing on H.R. 5055
and H.R. 6075 Before the Subcomm. on Emp't Opportunities of the H. Comm. on Educ. and La-
bor, 9 5 th Cong. (1977) (containing statements from Subcommittee Chairman Augustus F.
Hawkins and numerous witnesses, objecting to the Supreme Court's illegitimate reasoning
in Gilbert); H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 2 (1978) ("It is the committee's view that the dissent-
ing Justices [in Gilbert] correctly interpreted the Act."); S. REP. No. 95-331, at 2-3 (1977)
(similar).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe(k) (emphasis added).
123. See, e.g., Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 211 (1991) (invalidating an em-
ployer rule preventing young women, but not young men, from working with hazardous
substances).
124. Employment Policies Relating to Pregnancy and Childbirth, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,804, 23,807
(Apr. 20, 1979) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10).
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In Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC,125 the Supreme
Court agreed with the EEOC. The Court announced that the PDA had not only
overridden the Gilbert result, but had also renounced its reasoning. Ruling that
the company's relational discrimination was "because of sex," Newport News re-
lied upon the same kind of comparator argument later deployed in Hively. The
majority opinion held that the original Title VII (before the PDA), properly in-
terpreted, barred employment practices "treat[ing] a male employee with de-
pendents 'in a manner which but for that person's sex would be different."126
In other words, Title VII from the beginning had been a legislative endorse-
ment of the merit-based workplace, for the benefit of male as well as female
employees. To the extent Gilbert was decided under different premises, it had
been repudiated by the PDA. Newport News also conclusively abrogated the
Gilbert reasoning that discrimination affecting only a sex-based subgroup is not
sex discrimination. As a matter of Title VII doctrine, Newport News reflects the
Court's application of Title VII to relational discrimination and confirms the
comparator argument as a valid form of reasoning about whether there is dis-
crimination because of sex.127
Newport News did not explicitly rely on the associational discrimination ar-
gument, but lower court decisions since 1975 have all but uniformly interpreted
Title VII to regulate discrimination because of the race or ethnicity of one's in-
timate associates.128 The Supreme Court, in another statutory context, has also
accepted the associational discrimination argument and the Loving principle
that race-based discrimination is presumptively illegal even when it equally
affects all races (that is, when people with Caucasian as well as African or Asian
or Latino backgrounds are all similarly formally affected). Interpreting the In-
ternal Revenue Code, the Supreme Court in Bob Jones University v. United States
unanimously treated the university's bar to different-race marriage and dating
to be simple race discrimination.12 9
125. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
126. Id. at 683 (quoting L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978)).
127. Newport News is also inconsistent with Judge Sykes's effort to marginalize the comparator
argument as merely a convenience for ascertaining proof of underlying sexism. The Court's
comparator analysis is consistent with Chief Judge Wood's opinion.
128. The first such case was Whitney v. Greater N.Y Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp.
1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), and the first court of appeals decision was Parr v. Woodmen of the
World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888 (11th Cir. 1986), followed by all other circuit courts that
have addressed the issue. See Schwartz, supra note 85, at 223-32 (examining circuit court de-
cisions).
129. 461 U.S. 574, 580-81 (1983) (describing Bob Jones University's relational disciplinary rule
forbidding interracial dating and marriage). Justice Rehnquist's dissent did not dispute the
majority's view, noting that "this Court should not legislate for Congress" by "denying
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Loving's reasoning ought not be limited to race. If an employer is willing to
hire Catholics but not Catholics who marry outside their faith, surely the em-
ployer has engaged in discrimination "because of religion," also generally pro-
hibited by Title VII. The EEOC Compliance Manual notes that "Title VII pro-
hibits discrimination against an individual because s/he is associated with
another person of a particular religion. For example, it would be unlawful to
discriminate against a Christian because s/he is married to a Muslim."1"0 A
New York appellate court found an associational discrimination claim based on
religion cognizable under the New York State Human Rights Law, under
which claims are "analytically identical to claims brought under Title VII.""
Admittedly, this area of law is undeveloped, perhaps because few employers
openly discriminate in this way.132
As consistently applied by the EEOC and lower courts, Title VII applies to
race-based and religion-based employer rules or practices that affect all races
and all religions equally. Unless Title VII's bar to sex-based discrimination is
analytically different than its bars to race-based and religion-based discrimina-
tion, Title VII applies to sex-based rules or practices that affect men and wom-
en equally -contrary to the Hively dissent, the Evans majority, and the Justice
Department's position in Zarda. Interestingly, there is a great deal more to be
said about this stance, which receives support in some of the state marriage
equality cases. Those cases suggest a deeper understanding of judges' re-
sistance to the sex discrimination argument for gay rights.
3. Constitutional Challenges to Same-Sex Sodomy Laws and Same-Sex
Marriage Bars
There is a broader point to be made about the associational discrimination
argument. As previous scholars have argued, the Loving analogy has special bite
for lesbian, gay, and bisexual employees, because sexual orientation itself is in-
5 501(c) (3) status to organizations that practice racial discrimination." Id. at 622 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
130. EEOC Compliance Manual, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMIsSION 2-11(c), http://
www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/threshold.html [http://perma.cc/2F5U-2J98].
131. Chiara v. Town of New Castle, 2 N.Y. S.3d 132, 141 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (citations omitted)
(noting that an employee had an actionable claim when "subjected ... to employment dis-
crimination because his wife is Jewish"), motion for leave to appeal dismissed, 38 N.E. 3 d 805
(2015). But see Gallo v. W.B. Mason Co., No. 1o-1o618-RWZ, 2010 WL 4721064, at *1 (D.
Mass. Nov. 15, 2010) (noting that associational discrimination of this type remains an unset-
tled legal issue).
132. Cf Jessica Vogele, Associational Discrimination: How Far Can It Go?, 32 TOURO L. REV. 921,
930 (2016) (noting that there are few lawsuits based on associational discrimination).
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trinsically relational.' For gay men, lesbians, straight people, and bisexuals,
sexual orientation is relational to another person's sex-whether oriented to-
ward the same biological sex (gay), the "opposite" biological sex (straight), or
both (bisexual). Typically, a lesbian is subject to discrimination not because of
her sexual activities (such as oral sex, an activity most Americans enjoy), but
because of the biological sex of her partner. Constitutional challenges to laws
discriminating against lesbian and gay persons illustrate this point, as well as
its complexities.
This phenomenon is apparent in Lawrence v. Texas,134 in which the Su-
preme Court constitutionally protected two men engaged in private consensual
sex from being penalized by the Texas "homosexual conduct law." The law's
command was simple: "A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate
sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex."' Deviate sexual
intercourse was defined to include anal sex, oral sex, and sex toys.136 Two per-
sons of different sexes could engage in oral sex without a legal problem; in-
deed, a gay man and a lesbian (i.e., "homosexuals") could lawfully engage in
consensual oral sex with one another, consistent with the Texas statute."' Even
though the statutory crime was only defined by reference to "sex" and was
completely relational (two or more people defined by "sex" have to be acting in
concert), the Supreme Court majority opinion assumed that the objects of the
statute were "homosexual persons"' or "homosexuals, lesbians, [and] bisexu-
al[s]," as the majority opinion put it in one passage."' Justice O'Connor's con-
curring opinion said this: "The Texas statute makes homosexuals unequal in the
eyes of the law by making particular conduct [i.e., deviate sexual intercourse
between persons of the 'same sex'] - and only that conduct - subject to criminal
133. See, e.g., Zachary A. Kramer, Heterosexuality and Title VII, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 205, 226
(2009); Holning Lau, Transcending the Individualist Paradigm in Sexual Orientation Antidis-
crimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REv. 1271, 1312-13 (20o6); Schwartz, supra note 85, at 249. See
generally Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious Exemptions,
and the Production of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 100 CALIF. L. REv. 1169, 1196-99
(2012) (discussing sexual orientation as a relational identity).
134. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
135. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.o6 (West 2017).
136. Id. § 21.01(1).
137. Cf Evans v. Ga. Reg'l Hosp., 850 F.3 d 1248, 1258-59 (11th Cir. 2017) (Pryor, J., concurring)
(finding it somehow relevant that many gay and lesbian people choose to enter "mixed-
orientation marriages,' namely, to persons of the opposite sex).
138. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567, 573 (referring to a "practicing homosexual"), 575 (referring to
"homosexual persons"); cf id. at 570 (referring to "same-sex couples").
139. Id. at 574.
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sanction."140 That the Justices in the majority reflexively moved back and forth
between the sex-based classification and the affected class of "homosexuals"
without any explanation suggests how pervasively our society, our language,
and our constitutional culture assume that homosexuality is relational and is
relational because of sex.
Exactly ten years after Lawrence, the Court struck down Section 3 of the De-
fense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in United States v. Windsor.14 1 The challenged
provision provided that "the word 'marriage' means only a legal union between
one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers
only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife."142 Nowhere
does the DOMA text mention discrimination or exclusion because of sexual
orientation; the DOMA discriminations and exclusions are solely because of
sex (or, more precisely, the sex of the two putative spouses). Yet the Court's
analysis began, and pretty much ended, with the finding that Congress passed
the law to express "both moral disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral con-
viction that heterosexuality better comports with traditional (especially Judeo-
Christian) morality."143 As before, the Court did not require any explanation as
to why a sex-based bar should be treated as a law discriminating on the basis of
sexual orientation. Even the no-holds-barred dissenting opinion did not chal-
lenge this obvious point.
State marriage equality litigation addressed the sex discrimination argu-
ment for gay rights more directly. Almost half of states have constitutional
ERAs.144 The Supreme Court of Hawaii in Baehr v. Lewinl4 5 famously ruled
that the state constitutional bar to discrimination because of sex required the
state to demonstrate a compelling justification for its same-sex marriage bar.
Hawaii's Constitutional Convention, convened in 1978, understood that a bar
140. Id. at 581 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added); cf id. at 581-82 (noting that the
Texas law "brands all homosexuals as criminals"). But see Evans, 850 F.3 d at 1259 (Pryor, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that "homosexuals" in "mixed-orientation marriages" would be ex-
empt from Justice O'Connor's sweeping statement).
141. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
142. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012).
143. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (quoting the DOMA House committee report, H.R. REP. No.
104-664, at 16 (1996)). DOMA's clear purpose was to promote an "interest in protecting the
traditional moral teachings reflected in heterosexual-only marriage laws." Id. (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 104-664 at 16 (1996)).
144. See, e.g., NEB. CONST. art. I, § 30; OR. CONST. art. I, § 46; Linda J. Wharton, State Equal
Rights Amendments Revisited: Evaluating Their Effectiveness in Advancing Protection Against Sex
Discrimination, 36 RUTGERs L.J. 1201, 1202 (2005) (cataloguing another twenty-two states
with ERAs in their state constitutions).
145. 8 52 P.2d 4 4 (Haw. 1993).
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to sex discrimination not only protects women but also protects lesbians and
gay men.146 Hawaii's constitutional framers as well as its justices understood
antigay discrimination itself as relational: when an institution discriminates
against a lesbian, it is doing so because of the sex of her preferred romantic
partner, the object of her desire.
Baehr has been criticized as well as praised, and most judges -including
those who have ruled in favor of marriage equality-have been reluctant to ad-
dress the Loving analogy for gay marriage, even as others have embraced it.147
Some judges have explicitly rejected the argument. In a leading case, California
Chief Justice Ron George interpreted the state constitution to invalidate the
same-sex marriage exclusion. His opinion for the court applied heightened
scrutiny for two reasons: the exclusion of same-sex couples was both a denial of
the fundamental right to marry and an exclusion from marital benefits and du-
ties because of a suspect classification, namely, sexual orientation. Although
three of the seven justices found the Loving analogy persuasive as applied to sex
discrimination as well, the chief justice (and the controlling vote) rejected it
explicitly.148 Why should gay rights and marriage equality piggyback on the
advances made by women for sex equality?
146. At the Convention, the Committee on the Bill of Rights stated: "The question of whether
provisions regarding discrimination based on sexual orientation should be included in the
Constitution concerned your Committee .... Your Committee believes that the inclusion of
such a provision would be duplicative of the equal protection and due process protections al-
ready existing in the Constitution. Accordingly, your Committee believes that the inclusion
of a provision related to discrimination based on sexual orientation would be superfluous." 1
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF HAWAII OF 1978: JOURNALS AND
DOCUMENTS 675 (Chief Clerk of the Convention ed., 1980); accord Christopher J. Keller, Di-
vining the Priest: A Case Comment on Baehr v. Lewin, 12 LAW & INEQUALITY 483, 517 (1994).
147. Compare Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3 d 456 ( 9 th Cir. 2014) (striking down same-sex marriage ban
on the ground that sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect classification), with id. at 478 (Rein-
hardt, J., concurring) (deeming Loving "the most directly on point" of the "fundamental
right to marry trilogy"), with id. at 479-90 (Berzon, J., concurring) (arguing that a same-sex
marriage ban is sex discrimination subject to heightened scrutiny on that ground). Judge
Berzon was a primary drafter of the PDA and was prevailing counsel in both Newport News
and Johnson Controls, cases that represent leading interpretations of the PDA. JULIANNA S.
GONEN, LITIGATION As LOBBYING: REPRODUCTIVE HAZARDS AND INTEREST AGGREGATION 6o-
62(2003).
148. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3 d 384 (Cal. 2008) (majority opinion for 4-3 court). My gen-
eralizations about the nonpublic preferences of the four majority justices in the Marriage
Cases are based upon conversations with court personnel and close observers. All four ma-
jority justices concluded that LGBT people enjoyed the fundamental right to marry and that
sexual orientation is a suspect classification, but three of the four (Justices Kennard, Werde-
gar, and Moreno) also believed or were open to the argument that the exclusion of same-sex
couples from marriage was sex discrimination that could not survive strict scrutiny.
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Chief Justice George's opinion dovetails with Judge Sykes's objection to the
Loving analogy. The table below explains why lawyers and judges have tradi-
tionally not accepted the sex discrimination argument for gay rights: there is a
lack of symmetry among the classification, the class that is harmed, and the
harmful ideology that the antidiscrimination rule would reject.
TABLE 1.
WHY SOME JUDGES DO NOTACCEPTTHE LOVINGANALOGY FOR LGBT RIGHTS
HarmfulClassification Class Harmed HamflIdeology
Loving v. Virginia Race Racial Minorities Racism
ERA Sex Women Sexism
. Lesbians-
Baehr v. Lewin; '
' Sex Gay Men; HomophobiaHively v. Ivy Tech .iexal
Bisexuals
Lawyers love symmetry. The foregoing table disturbs them. Nonlawyers like
simple, intuitive rules. Occam's razor cuts against the Loving analogy for many
intelligent Americans.
The precepts of symmetry and simplicity underwrite Judge Sykes's Hively
dissent, the Justice Department's Zarda brief, and, most likely, the Eleventh
Circuit's majority opinion in Evans. The lack of symmetry among the classifica-
tion, class, and ideology targeted for regulation might explain why a number of
bills and statutes have prohibited both sex and sexual orientation (as well as
gender identity) discrimination: they are different categories, protect different
classes of Americans, and regulate different ideologies (sexism versus homo-
phobia). And, as Judges Sykes and Pryor argue, this also explains why in ordi-
nary parlance sex discrimination is not immediately mentioned when a gay
person is being excluded.
Is this a decisive objection to the relational discrimination arguments - and
hence to the opinions of Chief Judge Wood and Judge Flaum? Again, the legis-
lative record is instructive. As congressional committees noted in their PDA re-
ports, some states had bars to both sex and pregnancy discrimination.1 4 9 Per-
149. E.g., S. REP. No. 95-331, at 3 (1977) (noting that some states, "which now provide greater
protection for women workers than Title VII does under the Gilbert case, have laws which
specifically refer to pregnancy," while in other states, "laws very similar to Title VII have
been interpreted to protect women from discrimination based on conditions related to preg-
nancy").
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haps Gilbert could have been justified, as a matter of text-based interpretation,
by this contrast. It is clear from the reports, however, that the PDA Congress
did not think this was a valid justification.5 0
Judges Frank Easterbrook and Kenneth Ripple, no easy votes for a job dis-
crimination plaintiff, joined the Hively majority opinion. So, judges strongly
committed to text-based, rule-of-law values can agree with Chief Judge Wood.
In such cases, the statutory interpreter needs to dig more deeply. Like Judge
Rosenbaum in the Eleventh Circuit and Judge Rovner, who authored the origi-
nal panel opinion in Hively, "' I also want to think about the issue from another
angle, namely, the purpose of Title VII to free workers of gender stereotypes.
B. Sex as Gender: Homophobia as Prescriptive Sex Stereotyping
Although I am inclined to see the issue as the Seventh Circuit majority did,
there is room for debate about the application of the statutory language to the
facts of Hively and Evans. In such instances, interpreters routinely consult stat-
utory purpose to derive principles that might resolve -or suggest -a statutory
ambiguity.1 52 As with the text, Title VII's overall purpose-the merit-based
workplace with respect to race, color, national origin, religion, and sex-has
filled out over time and enjoyed a complicated interplay with constitutional
discourse. Title VII has been authoritatively, and repeatedly, interpreted to reg-
ulate employer gender stereotyping. Congress has endorsed, in both statutory
text and vast legislative deliberations, the notion that discrimination because of
sex includes employer policies that impose gender-based norms onto male and
female employees alike. The merit-based workplace entrenched by Title VII re-
flects a statutory purpose to protect workers against being penalized because of
gender-based stereotypes. Sex-stereotyping claims are ones that affect male and
female employees equally, and this understanding of the statutory purpose
provides a way to understand how classification, class, and harmful ideology
reconnect in Title VII cases involving LGBT claimants.
150. Id. at 2-3 (embracing the view of Gilbert's dissenting opinions). In contrast, the Committee
found these states as support for- not evidence against- their overarching view of sex dis-
crimination. Id.
151. Yet another example is Judge Marsha Berzon, the PDA drafter who embraced the sex dis-
crimination argument for gay rights in Latta, 771 F.3d at 479-90 (Berzon, J., concurring).
152. Indeed, textualism itself cannot yield plain meanings without considering statutory purpose.
Text and purpose are like the blades of a pair of scissors: neither can operate without the
other. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 56; Kavanaugh, supra note 26, at 2122-23 (reviewing
ICATZMANN, supra note 26).
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1. The 1964 Act and the 1972 Amendments
Because the congressional discussion of the House amendment that added
"sex" to the job discrimination title was brief, most judges and scholars have
ignored the expressions of purpose in the deliberations underpinning the 1964
Act -but they were abundantly expressed by House members who supported
the addition of "sex" to Title VII. The main argument made by representatives
against adding "sex" to the law was that prohibiting this form of discrimination
would facilitate women's employment outside the home and thereby under-
mine the American family. The main argument made by representatives in favor
of the addition was that women, in particular, are unfairly denied equal eco-
nomic opportunities because of widely held stereotypes about women and their
capabilities."' In Martin Marietta, the first Supreme Court decision on Title VII
sex discrimination, Justice Marshall's concurring opinion grounded Title VII in
a purpose to outlaw job decisions based on "stereotyped characterizations of
the sexes."154 This is a broader purpose than outlawing job decisions that treat
all men and all women differently, for stereotypes will often affect only some
and not all women and will often affect both men and women in parallel ways.
Previous scholars have made a useful distinction between descriptive and
prescriptive sex-based stereotypes.' Descriptive stereotypes are assumptions
about the different capabilities and limitations supposedly linked with one's bi-
ological sex. If an employer believes most women are emotional and passive
and do not possess the same work ethic as men, this descriptive gender stereo-
type will disadvantage qualified women applying for supervisory positions re-
quiring initiative and long hours. 15 6 Prescriptive stereotypes are preferences
about what roles and attitudes ought to be associated with each biological sex. If
an employer believes that women ought to be passive and compliant with
men's initiatives, this prescriptive gender stereotype will disadvantage women
153. Franklin, supra note 55, at 1320-29 (2012) (assembling evidence from the 1964 congressional
debates).
154. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544-45 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(per curiam) (citing Equal Empl. Opportunity Commission, Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (a)(1)(ii)).
155. See Diana Burgess & Eugene Borgida, Who Women Are, Who Women Should Be: Descriptive
and Prescriptive Gender Stereotyping in Sex Discrimination, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 665
(1999); Zachary R. Herz, Note, Price's Progress: Sex Stereotyping and Its Potential for Antidis-
crimination Law, 124 YALE L.J. 396 (2014).
156. See Schultz, supra note 55, at lolo-11 (setting forth an array of descriptive stereotypes that
hold women back in the workplace).
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applying for supervisory positions."' If Title VII were understood to police
prescriptive stereotypes, that would entail a broad understanding of the statu-
tory purpose, well beyond policing policies that treated all men and all women
differently.
The original justifications for the sex discrimination provision in Title VII
addressed both kinds of stereotyping. Women were disadvantaged in the
workplace because employers believed that women's natural inclination was to
be mothers and housekeepers (descriptive stereotyping) and that this was what
a woman should be doing (prescriptive stereotyping). For some "helper" occu-
pations such as nursing, men were disadvantaged by stereotypes as well. By its
broad text and apparent legislative purpose, Title VII was supposed to make
stereotype-based discrimination illegal.' Qualified women ought to be doc-
tors, and qualified men ought to be nurses. Because stereotyping can affect
both sexes, Title VII from the beginning was not just focused on rules that only
disadvantaged one sex or the other.
During its deliberations in 1972, Congress's committees agreed with and
expanded upon this broad understanding of the statutory purpose. Arguing for
an expansion of Title VII to include local, state, and federal government em-
ployers and to empower the EEOC, committee reports understood that sex dis-
crimination remained pervasive in the workplace, in large part because of the
traditional stereotype that a woman's proper role in life was as a wife and
mother in the home.`9 In other words, a broad anti-stereotype understanding
of Title VII was a building block upon which Congress constructed the 1972
Amendments,16 0 and it was a central justification for Congress exercising its
Fourteenth Amendment power to abrogate state immunity from lawsuits for
sex discrimination in government workplaces.16 1
157. See id.
158. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 729-30 (2003).
159. H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 4-5 (1971); see also Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 437 F. Supp.
413, 426-27 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (surveying the committee reports).
16o. Representative Patsy Mink noted that, despite Title VII, " [t]he view that employment dis-
crimination against women is perfectly natural and only reflects the inherent differences be-
tween the sexes continues to the detriment of the entire Nation." 117 CONG. REC. 32,105
(1971) (statement of Rep. Mink). EEOC Chairman William H. Brown III expressed these
persisting stereotypes in stark terms, analogizing the "happy homemaker" stereotype to that
of the "happy slave." Equal Employment Opportunities Enforcement Act of 1971: Hearing on S.
2515 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the S. Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare, 92d Cong. 51
(1971) (statement of William H. Brown III, Chairman, EEOC).
161. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 729-30 (upholding the application of the Family and Medical Leave Act to
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2. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 and the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993
Congress in 1972 emphatically rejected the acceptability of sex-based ste-
reotyping in a meritocratic society -and the Supreme Court followed a similar
approach in its equal protection jurisprudence. Notwithstanding the declining
fortunes of the ERA, the Court interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to
afford heightened scrutiny to sex-based classifications - scrutiny that was gen-
erally fatal when the state's justifications were grounded in traditional stereo-
types, even when those stereotypes harmed men. In Craig v. Boren, the leading
case, the plaintiff was a man who was disadvantaged by stereotypes of young
women as more responsible and less wild than young men.162 The Court ruled
that a law allowing eighteen- to twenty-one-year-old women but not eighteen-
to twenty-one-year-old men to buy 3.2% beer impermissibly relied upon "out-
dated misconceptions concerning the role of females in the home rather than in
the 'marketplace and world of ideas."'163
Craig invalidated a law resting upon descriptive stereotypes that disadvan-
taged young men (as immature decisionmakers), but Gilbert upheld an em-
ployment practice that disadvantaged women based upon both prescriptive and
descriptive stereotypes. That is, General Electric and other employers refused
to spend more money to cover pregnancies as either insurable events or as dis-
abilities in part because they believed that women were not likely to return to
work after they had a child (descriptive), and in part because they believed that
the new mother ought to stay at home with her baby (prescriptive). The im-
mediate and powerful feminist indictment of Gilbert rested on the view that de-
scriptive and prescriptive stereotyping based upon pregnancy were self-
fulfilling prophecies that formed a deep foundation for workplace inequality
because of sex.
Representing the coalition of feminist, religious, civil libertarian, and other
groups supporting pregnancy discrimination legislation, Professor Wendy
Webster Williams was the lead witness introducing the Gilbert override bill in
both House and Senate hearings. She testified that barring pregnancy discrim-
ination was central to the statutory goal of barring descriptive and prescriptive
stereotypes from the merit-based workplace. Accordingly, the assumptions
"that women would and, in fact, should get married and have children and
leave the work force have led to the view that women are marginal workers not
162. 429 U.S. 190, 192, 199-201 (1976).
163. Id. at 198-99.
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deserving of the emoluments of the 'real' workers in the work force."164 in sup-
port of the pregnancy legislation, the ABA stated:
Employer pregnancy rules which treat pregnancy differently from other
disabilities reflect the generally held stereotype that women will and
should marry [men], become pregnant and leave the work force to raise
their children. This stereotype has had a serious inhibiting effect on the
employment opportunities of women and is not supported by the
facts.165
Congress passed the PDA by overwhelming margins, and the committee
reports and sponsors' explanations closely followed Professor Williams's articu-
lation. For example, the Senate report assailed Gilbert as undermining the "cen-
tral purpose of the sex discrimination prohibitions of Title VII. As the testimo-
ny received by this committee demonstrates, the assumption that women will
become pregnant and leave the labor market is at the core of the sex stereotyp-
ing resulting in unfavorable disparate treatment of women in the workplace."166
As a formal matter, the PDA protected pregnant women against various
forms of employment discrimination, but Congress's purpose in enacting the
PDA was also to repudiate the form of reasoning the Court followed in Gilbert
and to reaffirm and entrench as the central purpose of Title VII the notion that
no one should be denied employment opportunities based upon descriptive or
prescriptive stereotypes about the capabilities of men and women.167 Like all
employees, "pregnant workers [must] be treated the same as other employees
on the basis of their ability or inability to work."168
164. 1977 Hearings, supra note 121 (statement of Wendy W. Williams, Assistant Professor of Law,
Georgetown Law Center).
165. AM. BAR Ass'N, SECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, REPORT TO THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES 3 (Feb. 1978).
166. S. REP. No. 95-331, at 3 (1977); accord H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 3 (1978); 123 CONG. REC.
29,641 (1977) (statement of Sen. Bayh). Similarly, Representative John LaFalce made the
following remarks in support of the PDA:
Employers who believe pregnant women are unable to continue working or do
not desire to return to work are imposing stereotypical notions on their employ-
ees which are archaic and undocumented .... The Supreme Court's ruling in Gil-
bert has served to reinforce the outdated argument that women depend upon
men, and not their jobs, for support.
124 CONG. REC. 21,440-41 (1978) (statement of Rep. LaFalce).
167. Cal. Fed. Say. &Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 284-85, 288-89 (1987).
168. H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 3; see 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe(k) (2012) (similar language codified in
the PDA's definition of "sex").
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The PDA was a major congressional rebuke to narrow Title VII construc-
tions based upon judicial speculation about "how far" Congress intended to
take antidiscrimination norms regarding sex. Congress's answer was that the
text of the 1964 Act took the country fairly far, and the PDA was merely re-
affirming the original meaning of the statutory text, read in light of the anti-
stereotyping purpose of the 1964 Congress. As labor economists demonstrated
after 1978, however, the PDA was a limited remedy for the pervasive problem
of descriptive and prescriptive stereotyping. A common stereotype that held
women back in the workplace was the employer view that men are, and should
be, more focused on work than on family. The PDA provided no opportunity
for new fathers to take care of their infants or otherwise to show a dedication to
family traditionally attributed just to mothers. 16 9
Starting in 1985, congressional hearings explored the ways in which men's
inability to take family leave reinforced both descriptive and prescriptive stereo-
types of male employees as work-oriented and female employees as family-
oriented.170 From the beginning, legislators heard testimony from a variety of
sources about the importance of having gender-neutral family leave policies in
order to counteract these stereotypes. Law professors and women's rights advo-
cates emphasized that the lack of family leave standards reflected the idealiza-
tion of "a male work force with wives performing the traditional and necessary
functions in the home,""' and the "pervasive presumption that women are
mothers first, and workers second."172 Congress also learned that among the
16g. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 103-8, Pt. 2, at 11 (1993) (pointing out that because all the PDA re-
quired was formal equality, if an employer provided no disability leave at all, "it is in full
compliance with anti-discrimination laws"); The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1987: Joint
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Mgmt. Relations. and the Subcomm. on Labor Standards
of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, looth Cong. 239 (1987) (statement of Donna Lenhoff,
Associate Director for Legal Policy and Programs, Women's Legal Defense Fund) (explain-
ing that while the PDA prohibited "outright workplace discrimination,' it did not address
the fact that "our employment policies continue to operate as if women's role is to stay home
and care for the family, and men's role is to work outside the home").
170. Donna R. Lenhoff & Lissa Bell, Government Support for Working Families and for Communi-
ties: Family and Medical Leave as a Case Study, in LEARNING FROM THE PAST - LOOKING TO THE
FUTURE: WORK, FAMILY AND DEMOCRACY PROJECT (Christopher Beem & Jody Heynmann
eds., 2002).
171. Parental and Disability Leave: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil Serv. and the Sub-
comm. on Comp. and Emp't. Benefits of the H. Comm. on Post Office and Civil Serv. and the Sub-
comm. on Labor Standards of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 9 9 th Cong. io (1985) (state-
ment of Wendy W. Williams, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center).
172. The Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1986: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Mgmt.
Relations and the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 9 9 th
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employers who did provide some form of family leave, most of them offered
this leave only to women, in my view because employers assumed that men
would not and should not want to take family leave. 17
In 1993, Congress passed and the President signed the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), 174 which requires employers to give unpaid leave to
both male and female employees for family care (and other) purposes. The
goal of the statute was to encourage men as well as women to break out of tra-
ditional stereotypes. The best strategy for a sex-integrated workforce, at the top
end as well as lower down, was to encourage women who wanted or needed to
work outside the home to pursue their vocations and to encourage working
men to engage in child and elder care inside their families. 7 '
Like Title VII, as amended, the purpose of the FMLA is to undermine disa-
bling stereotypes about men as well as women in the worldorce. The 1993 law
is remarkable in the salience that it gives to prescriptive stereotypes, based up-
on employer preferences as well as assumptions about the ways employee fami-
ly choices played out in the workplace. Some employers might support the
norm that working women ought to marry working men, bear their children,
and put the family first -but the FMLA makes it illegal for the employer to in-
stitutionalize this norm as workplace policy.
3. Hopkins and the 1991 Amendments
Prior to the PDA, the typical Title VII case emphasized descriptive stereo-
types that were overbroad (i.e., they applied to many women or many men but
not all women or all men). Many of the post-PDA sex discrimination cases re-
flected stereotypes that were more prescriptive. Indeed, some were entirely pre-
scriptive. For example, the Court held in International Union v. Johnson Controls,
Cong. ioo (1986) [hereinafter PMLA 1986 Hearing] (statement of Women's Legal Defense
Fund).
173. See, e.g., Family and Medical Leave Act of 1989: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Children, Fami-
ly, Drugs, and Alcoholism of the H. Comm. on Labor and Human Res., ioist Cong. 2 (1989)
(statement of Sen. Chris Dodd) (citing a Chamber of Commerce study which found that
75% of employers offer no leave for fathers).
174. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6.
175. See Nev. Dep't Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 736 (2003) (finding that the FMLA tar-
gets "denial or curtailment of women's employment opportunities" that are "traceable direct-
ly to the pervasive presumption that women are mothers first, and workers second" and that
"[s]tereotypes about women's domestic roles are reinforced by parallel stereotypes presum-




THE SEX DISCRIMINATION ARGUMENT FOR LGBT WORKPLACE PROTECTIONS
Inc. 176 that a paternalistic policy barring only female employees of childbearing
age from positions where they would be exposed to lead, which affects both the
male and female reproductive systems, constituted sex discrimination in viola-
tion of Title VII. The Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's ruling that the em-
ployer was responding to legitimate fetal health concerns and not stereotypes,
and further held that the discriminatory policy was not a bona fide occupation-
al qualification.177 It was grounded in prescriptive stereotypes and was not
merit-based.
The leading case on prescriptive stereotyping is Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
kins.17 ' Ann Hopkins was allegedly denied partnership not because the em-
ployer (the accounting firm Price Waterhouse) did not think women could do a
good job, and not because she was unlikely to enrich the firm, but instead be-
cause she did not fit the firm's image of a proper woman. According to some
partners, she was too pushy, too masculine, not feminine enough to meet their
prescription for a proper female executive.1 7 9
In Hopkins, the employer assertedly denied a position based on prescriptive
stereotypes alone, rather than descriptive stereotypes or a mix of descriptive
and prescriptive. The Supreme Court majority held that an employer decision
grounded in prescriptive stereotypes about women (i.e., this is how women
should be) constituted discrimination because of sex.so The plurality opinion
responded to the employer's argument that the evidence of prescriptive sex ste-
reotyping ought not be dispositive:
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day
when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting
that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, for " [i] n
forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of
499 U.S. 187 (1991).
Id. The Court reversed a Seventh Circuit en banc decision. Dissenting from the en banc dis-
position, and essentially vindicated by the Supreme Court, were Judges Posner, Easterbrook,
and Flaum (all in the Hively majority). See Schultz, supra note 55, at 1072-81, for a critique of
the Court's aberrant decision in California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S.
272 (1987), which upheld a progressive statute benefitting pregnant women but otherwise
echoed the form of reasoning in Gilbert.
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
179. Id. at 235.
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their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of dispar-
ate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes."
If a woman has a claim for prescriptive stereotyping because the employer con-
siders her too masculine, a man ought to have such a claim against an employer
who considers him too feminine.182
In the wake of Hopkins, most of the federal courts of appeals have ruled that
LGBT employees have a Title VII claim if they adequately allege they were dis-
criminated against because they do not conform to traditional gender roles and
stereotypes.' Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit unanimously ruled in Evans that
the lesbian employee's claim for gender discrimination could go to trial. Judge
Rosenbaum maintained in dissent that if Jameka Evans had a claim for dis-
crimination because she did not conform to prescriptive stereotypes about
proper gender presentation by a woman, the same analysis supports a claim for
discrimination because of her sexual orientation, which violates the prescriptive
stereotype that women should only find sexual fulfillment through intercourse
with (and perhaps marriage to) a man. The deepest violation of entrenched
gender roles is a woman's romantic partnership or marriage to another woman.
It is a blatant violation of the core gender role: the gendered requirement that
women are not fulfilled unless they find the right man, marry him, and rear his
children in their household. 184
181. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 251 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting L.A. Dep't of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,707 n.13 (1978)).
182. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. College, 830 F.3 d 698, 705-o6 (7 th Cir. 2016); see Mary Anne C.
Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law
and FeministJurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995).
183. Circuit court opinions have recognized a Hopkins gender-stereotyping claim for specific
LGBT employees under Title VII. See EEOC v. Boh Bros. Construction Co., 689 F.3d 458 (5th
Cir. 2012) (recognizing that an employee perceived as a gay could potentially bring a Hop-
kins-style claim); Hunter v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 697 F.3d 697, 702-704 (8th Cir. 2012)
(holding that an employee could bring a Hopkins-style claim but in this case failed to estab-
lish a prima facie case of sex discrimination); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3 d 1312, 1317-19 (11th
Cir. 2011); Prowel v. Wise Business Forms, Inc., 579 F.3 d 285, 290-93 (3d Cir. 2009); Vickers v.
Fairfield Medical Center, 453 F.3 d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 20o6); Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398
F.3 d 211, 217-218 (2d Cir. 2005); Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., 256 F.3 d 864,
874 ( 9 th Cir. 2001); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3 d 252, 259 (1st Cir.
1999). For district court opinions in jurisdictions without a circuit court opinion, see Finkle
v. Howard County, 12 F. Supp. 3d 780, 789 (D. Md. 2014); and Terveer v. Billington, 34 F.
Supp. 3d loo, 115-16 (D.D.C. 2014). See generally Brian Soucek, Perceived Homosexuals: Look-
ing Gay Enough for Title VII, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 715, 726 (2014) (providing an excellent ac-
count of this line of cases).
184. Accord Hively, 830 F.3 d at 705-o6.
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At the outset, notice that a gender-stereotyping jurisprudence is incon-
sistent with an understanding of Title VII that limits its prohibitions to practic-
es that affect only male or only female employees. Prescriptive stereotyping
often affects both male and female employees - the same kind of symmetry that
is reflected in associational discrimination claims following the Loving analogy.
Conversely, this symmetry was rejected by Judge Sykes's Hively dissent and by
the Justice Department's Zarda brief, both of which explicitly limit Title VII to
practices that affect only men or only women. As before, please notice that nei-
ther Judge Sykes nor the Trump Administration justified such a class-based fo-
cus by analysis of the statutory text, which only regulates by classification (ra-
ther than by class).
Judge Rovner's panel opinion in Hively explored the problem appellate
courts now face in gender-stereotyping cases brought by gay and lesbian em-
ployees. The courts have sought to reconcile Hopkins gender-stereotyping
claims with their circuit precedents denying sexual orientation claims "either by
disallowing any claims where sexual orientation and gender non-conformity
are intertwined (and, for some courts, by not allowing claims from lesbian,
gay, or bisexual employees at all), or by trying to tease apart the two claims and
focusing only on the gender stereotype allegations.""'
The first approach, simply denying lesbian and gay employees the gender-
stereotyping claims that everyone else can make, ought to be off the table for
constitutional reasons. Shortly after Hopkins, the Supreme Court overturned an
antigay state constitutional amendment in Romer v. Evans.186 The amendment
preempted state and local laws and directives specifically barring sexual orien-
tation discrimination, which the Court found problematic, but another feature
deepened the equal protection problem with the amendment.
It is a fair, if not necessary, inference from the broad language of the
amendment that it deprives gays and lesbians even of the protection of
general laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary discrimination in gov-
ernmental and private settings. . . . If this consequence follows from
Amendment 2, as its broad language suggests, it would compound the
constitutional difficulties the law creates.18 7
Without determining exactly how far the state constitutional amendment
swept, the Court struck it down:
185. Id. at 705.
186. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
187. Id. at 630.
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Central both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitution's
guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government and each
of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assis-
tance. "Equal protection of the laws is not achieved through indiscrimi-
nate imposition of inequalities.""'
Romer recognizes a constitutional background principle admonishing judg-
es against carving LGBT people out of the normal protections of any statutory
scheme, including Title VII. The constitutional questions raised by an explicit
LGBT carve-out are sufficiently serious to trigger the constitutional avoidance
canon the Supreme Court follows in sensitive areas of law.
Like the Eleventh Circuit in Evans, most circuits have tried to tease apart
the two claims. Unfortunately, it is hard to differentiate these two types of
claims, as Judge Rovner explained:
Discrimination against gay, lesbian, and bisexual employees comes
about because their behavior is seen as failing to comply with the quin-
tessential gender stereotype about what men and women ought to do -
for example, that men should have romantic and sexual relationships
only with women, and women should have romantic and sexual rela-
tionships only with men. In this way, almost all discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation can be traced back to some form of discrimi-
nation on the basis of gender nonconformity. Gay men face discrimina-
tion if they fail to meet expected gender norms by dressing in a manner
considered too effeminate for men, by displaying stereotypical feminine
mannerisms and behaviors, by having stereotypically feminine inter-
ests, or failing to meet the stereotypes of the rough and tumble man.
Co-workers and employers discriminate against lesbian women for dis-
playing the parallel stereotypical male characteristics. But even if those
employees display no physical or cosmetic signs of their sexual orienta-
tion, lesbian women and gay men nevertheless fail to conform to gen-
der norm expectations in their attractions to partners of the same sex.
Lesbian women and gay men upend our gender paradigms by their
very status - causing us to question and casting into doubt antiquated
and anachronistic ideas about what roles men and women should play
in their relationships. Who is dominant and who is submissive? Who is
charged with earning a living and who makes a home? Who is a father
and who a mother? In this way the roots of sexual orientation discrimi-
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nation and gender discrimination wrap around each other inextrica-
bly.189
Illustrating Judge Rovner's point, the experience of women in the military
during the long period of antigay exclusion was that such policies were bad for
all female personnel, with straight as well as bisexual and gay women subject to
antilesbian witch hunts.o90 This reflects another doctrinal point. Laws barring
workplace discrimination because of sexual orientation usually include "per-
ceived" sexual orientation. So a straight woman, like Ann Hopkins, might be
discriminated against because some supervisors perceived her to be lesbian-
and the evidence they would cite, behind closed doors, would be largely the
same evidence before the Supreme Court: that she was too butch, needed to act
more feminine (i.e., available to men), and should go to charm school (to
please the male supervisors).
The tension reflected by these cases calls forth the virtue of common law
judging: apply all relevant precedents to new fact situations, and when incon-
sistencies between precedents become apparent, the judge needs to reconcile
the precedents. But if the reconciliation path is unworkable, as Judge Rovner
suggested in Hively, the court of appeals needs to narrow or overrule its own
precedents, in deference to those of the Supreme Court. This precept, essential
to the judicial contribution to the rule of law, inspired Judge Rovner's sugges-
tion that the Seventh Circuit revisit its sexual orientation precedents and was
an important feature of Chief Judge Wood's opinion for the en banc Court (an
opinion Judge Rovner joined).
Conversely, this precept is at odds with the dissenting opinion by Judge
Sykes, who sought to avoid conflict by insisting on stare decisis for the circuit
precedents and reading Hopkins as narrowly as possible, but for legally weak
reasons. Thus, she chided the Hively majority for invoking the Hopkins plurali-
ty opinion that she felt is not formally binding on the judiciary." That objec-
tion strikes me as incorrect. Five and probably six Justices (the four plurality
Justices and two Justices concurring in the judgment) agreed that the prescrip-
tive stereotyping alleged by Hopkins constituted sex discrimination in violation
of Title VII if she met her burden of proving she was not promoted "because
of" that stereotyping. The plurality and the concurring Justices parted compa-
189. Hively, 830 F.3d at 705-o6. Anticipating Judge Rovner's analysis is the excellent treatment in
Soucek, supra note 183, at 726.
190. See Michelle M. Benecke & Kirstin S. Dodge, Military Women in Nontraditional job Fields:
Casualties of the Armed Forces' War on Homosexuals, 13 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 215 (1990).
191. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3 d 339, 369-70 (7 th Cir. 2017) (Sykes, J., dissenting).
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ny over how the burden of proving "because of" causation should be allocat-
ed. 19 2
As suggested by Judges Flaum and Ripple, the congressional aftermath of
Hopkins is also significant. The Supreme Court handed down several restrictive
statutory workplace discrimination decisions in the 1988 Term (the same Term
as Hopkins) - to withering criticism from legal scholars, workplace experts, civil
libertarians, the EEOC, and the Department of Justice (regarding some of the
decisions). 93 Congressional hearings critically examined all of the Court's re-
cent Title VII decisions, including Hopkins. The sponsors of proposed amend-
ments to Title VII and the witnesses testifying before congressional committees
in 1990 and 1991 accepted or endorsed the substantive holding in Hopkins, but
wanted to liberalize the burden of proof in mixed-motive cases.1 94 Section 107
192. The lower court had found that impermissible sex-based motives (prescriptive stereotyping)
hurt Hopkins's chances to make partner but had also found permissible motives. In such a
mixed-motive case, Justice Brennan's plurality opinion (for four Justices) ruled that once
plaintiff demonstrated that impermissible sex discrimination played a role in a decision ad-
versely affecting the employee, the employer has the burden of demonstrating that it would
have made the same decision without considering the impermissible factor. Price Water-
house v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244-45 (1989). Concurring in the judgment, Justice
O'Connor said this: "There has been a strong showing that the employer has done exactly
what Title VII forbids, but the connection between the employer's illegitimate motivation
and any injury to the individual plaintiff is unclear." Id. at 266 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
the judgment). Also concurring in the judgment, Justice White only addressed the burden
of proof issue. Id. at 258-61 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). Five Justices (the Bren-
nan four plus O'Connor) explicitly ruled that the prescriptive stereotyping constituted dis-
crimination "because of sex," and a sixth Justice (White) must have assumed that holding,
as his concurring opinion discussed the proper burden of proof in mixed-motive cases such
as this one.
193. For references to the Court's controversial 1988 Term civil rights decisions, as well as criti-
cisms from the academy, the White House, and civil rights organizations, see Roy L. Brooks,
Beyond Civil Rights Restoration Legislation: Restructuring Title VII, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 551, 551
(1990); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President
Civil Rights Game, 79 CALIF. L. REv. 613, 613-17 (1991); and Charles A. Sullivan, Accounting
for Price Waterhouse: Proving Disparate Treatment Under Title VII, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 1107,
1107-11 (1991).
194. Hearings on H.R. 1, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Hearing on H.R. 1 Before the H. Comm. on
Educ. & Labor, 102d Cong. 9-12, 672 (1991) (draft language of H.R. 1; then statement of
People for the American Way Action Fund); Hearings on H.R. 400o, The Civil Rights Act of
1990- Volume 1: Hearing on H.R. 4ooo Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor & the Subcomm.
on Civil & Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, oist Cong. 9-10, 220, 366
(1990) [hereinafter CRA 1990 Hearing Vol. 1] (draft legislation of H.R. 4ooo; then state-
ment of Julius Levonne Chambers, Director-Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Education
Fund, Inc.; then statement of Donald B. Ayer, Deputy Att'y Gen., Department of Justice);
Hearings on H.R. 4ooo, The Civil Rights Act of 1990- Volume 3: Hearing on H.R. 400o Before
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of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 adopted Justice Brennan's basic rule: once the
plaintiff has shown that sex or race discrimination played a significant role in
denying job benefits, the burden shifts to the employer to show that it would
have made the same decision on legitimate grounds, without the discriminato-
ry considerations. Liberalizing the Brennan approach, however, Congress pro-
vided that the employer could still be liable if the discriminatory factor was "a
motivating factor,"9 even if not the necessary one, but elsewhere in Title VII
limited the relief that could be granted in such mixed-motive cases.1 96
In 1990-91, Congress heard testimony that Hopkins was substantively cor-
rect "in its acknowledgment that evidence of sex stereotyping is legitimate evi-
dence of gender discrimination."' Even some of the corporate interests vigor-
ously opposing the 1991 amendments recognized that Ann Hopkins had been
wronged because the prescriptive sex stereotyping she suffered was "very im-
permissible" under Title VIL 98 In committee reports, the sponsors were clear
that the section aimed at Hopkins only "overrules one aspect of the decision." 9 9
One committee report emphasized that these amendments would in no way
affect Hopkins's holding that "evidence of sex stereotyping is sufficient to prove
gender discrimination."2 00 There was also a congressional hearing devoted en-
tirely to the discrimination that women face in the worldorce. The subcommit-
tee chair concluded that while women "have the experience and skills for ad-
vancement," they were being held back by "misconceptions and stereotyping"
and in particular "outdated stereotypes about what women want in the work-
place."201 This is similar to the discrimination that Ann Hopkins suffered.
the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, oist Cong. 352-53 (1990) (statement of Ben T. Reyes, City
Council Member, Houston City Council).
195. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 20ooe-2(m) (2012)) (adding new § 703(m)).
196. Id. at § 1o7(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-5(g)(2)(B) (2012)) (adding new
§ 706(g)(2)(B)).
197. CRA 1990 Hearing Vol. 1, supra note 194 (statement of Judith Lichtman, President, Women's
Legal Defense Fund).
198. Hearings on H.R. 4ooo, The Civil Rights Act of 1990-Volume 2: Joint Hearings Before the
Comm. on Educ. and Labor and the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, ioist Cong. 201 (1990) (statement of David Maddux, Spokesman,
National Retail Federation).
199. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 48 (1991).
200. H.R. REP. No. 101-644, pt. 1, at 29, n.17 (1990).
201. Women and the Workplace: The Glass Ceiling: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Emp't and
Productivity of the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Res., 102nd Cong. 3 (1991) (statement of
Sen. Paul Simon, Chairman, Subcomm. on Emp't and Productivity).
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The foregoing legislative deliberations enrich our understanding of the text
and structure of the congressional override statute. Section 3(4) of the 1991
Amendments announced Congress's purpose "to respond to recent Supreme
Court decisions by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order
to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination," including Ann
Hopkins.2 02 Consistent with that purpose, Congress examined all the recent
Supreme Court Title VII decisions (including Hopkins), overrode most of them
(including Hopkins on the burden of proof issue), and left the substantive dis-
crimination holding of Hopkins intact. By that point even many employers had
accepted the illegitimacy of sex-based stereotypes, including prescriptive stere-
otypes as illustrated by Hopkins. This text and history are evidence enough that
the 1991 Amendments accepted as a building block for future policy the Hop-
kins holding that prescriptive stereotyping is actionable under Title VII.2 03 That
the supporters of the amendments repeatedly endorsed the substantive holding
is icing on a cake already well-frosted.
The Trump Administration's Justice Department claims that the 1991
Amendments ratified four circuit court decisions that it says held that lesbian
and gay employees had no rights under Title VII.2 04 The Department cites no
statutory text that ratified a narrowing of the statutory sex discrimination bar.
Moreover, the Department mischaracterizes two of the four cases. In Blum v.
Gulf Oil Corp., the Fifth Circuit held that a "Jewish homosexual" could be dis-
charged for using the employer's telephone during work hours for his private
business and then said, in dicta, that "[dlischarge for homosexuality is not
prohibited by Title VII."2 05 In Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., the Seventh Circuit
held that a transgender woman had no claim for relief under Title VII.2 06 Alt-
hough the court felt that the failure of Congress to pass bills protecting against
sexual orientation discrimination was relevant to the claims of a transgender
employee,20 7 the holding of the court was limited to gender identity under Title
VII (a stance that has been widely repudiated in the new millennium). Two
202. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(4), 105 Stat. 1071.
203. Cf. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 804 n-4 (1998) (holding that because Con-
gress in the 1991 Act did not disturb the Court's sexual harassment precedents, Congress is
presumed to have approved them, and their stare decisis effect is enhanced).
204. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 29, at io (listing four circuit court
decisions Congress allegedly "ratified" in the 1991 Amendments).
205. 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (citing only Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co., the Fifth Circuit case rejecting a gender stereotyping claim, a case that has probably
been abrogated by Hopkins).
2o6. 742 F.2d. 1081 (7 th Cir. 1984).
207. Id. at 1085-86.
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pre-1991 circuit court decisions did squarely hold that lesbian and gay employ-
ees had no rights under Title VII: the Ninth Circuit's decision in DeSantis v. Pa-
cific Telephone & Telegraph Co.208 and the Eighth Circuit's decision in Williamson
v. A. G. Edwards & Sons.2 09
The Department of Justice's claim is not well-grounded in the rule of law.
No Supreme Court decision has held that Congress ratified two (or even four)
circuit court precedents when it reenacted or revised a relevant statute.2 10 More
important, there was no discussion of DeSantis or Williamson in the 1990-91
congressional deliberations -in contrast to the extended focus on Hopkins.
Most important, the Department of Justice's claim that the 1991 Amendments
slammed the Title VII door on gay people is flatly inconsistent with the statu-
tory text. Not only did the 1991 Amendments clearly focus on Hopkins and cor-
rected only its stingy procedural holding, but section 3(4) stated that the pur-
pose of the 1991 Amendments was "to respond to recent decisions of the
Supreme Court [not to isolated court of appeals decisions] by expanding the scope
[not narrowing the scope] of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide
adequate protection to victims of discrimination [not to provide adequate pro-
tection to antigay employers]."211 It is uncharacteristic for the distinguished
lawyers of the Department of Justice to make an argument so poorly researched
and so wealdy justified by reference to statutory text and structure, Title VII's
purpose, and Supreme Court precedent.
Hopkins is also significant because it provides a doctrinal link to a
longstanding feminist understanding that a premise of sexism, the regime un-
208. 6o8 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9 th Cit. 1979).
209. 876 F.2d 69 (8th Cit. 1989) (per curiam).
21o. The Supreme Court has sometimes ruled that Congress ratifies a Supreme Court precedent
when it reenacts or revises a statute authoritatively construed by the Court, e.g., Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 804 1-4 (1998) (suggesting that the 1991 Amendments
buttressed the Supreme Court's sexual harassment precedents, which were left in place, con-
sistent with § 3(4)'s goal of confirming and expanding civil rights under Title VII), and
there are a few decisions giving weight to a consensus reached by all or almost all of the courts
of appeals that had been brought to the attention of Congress, e.g., Tex. Dep't of Hous. &
Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2519-20 (2015) (noting that
the enacting coalition of a 1988 amendment had explicitly discussed and relied on a consen-
sus interpretation reached by nine courts of appeals, with no dissent). But there is nothing
like the scenario set forth in the Trump Administration's brief, i.e., two courts of appeals in
short discussions, unmentioned in congressional deliberations and cutting against the ex-
pansive purpose set forth in the text of the new statute. Sad.
211. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(4), 1o5 Stat. 1071, 1071 (emphasis and
bracketed material added).
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der which women are subordinated, is compulsory heterosexuality.212 Poet
Adrienne Rich famously argued that women are not always naturally oriented
toward heterosexuality, nor do they always choose it freely, but are systemati-
cally pressed to enter into unequal relationships with men of all kinds by a pa-
triarchal culture replete with "fairy tales, television, films, advertising, popular
songs, [and] wedding pageantry."213 This culture punishes the lesbian experi-
ence as socially deviant and, in the past, as criminal. In this culture, to be a
woman is to be heterosexual, a prescriptive stance at odds with the integrity of
many women. Rich directly addressed the implications of compulsory hetero-
sexuality for lesbians in a workplace where women must endure sexual har-
assment as part of their employment: "her job depends on her pretending to be
not merely heterosexual but a heterosexual woman, in terms of dressing and
playing the feminine, deferential role required of 'real' women."2 1 4 Et voilh:
Ann Hopkins,2 15 Kimberly Hively, and Jameka Evans.
Consistent with Chief Judge Wood's relational discrimination arguments in
Hively, the poet Rich's analysis makes clear that prescriptive sexual stereotypes
about women contribute to a sexist system the purpose of which is to entrench
patriarchy, a system of beliefs and practices that subordinates women and pre-
vents them from having as many choices as men. "A lesbian is perceived as be-
ing outside the acceptable, routinized order of things .. . [and] as a threat to
the nuclear family, to male dominance and control, to the very heart of sex-
ism."2 16 Recall the STOP ERA cartoon above: a strong rule against discrimina-
212. Brian Soucek has faulted Hively for failing to engage the insights of feminist theory (includ-
ing the work of Adrienne Rich) to understand the nuances of Tide VII's text. See Brian
Soucek, Hively's Self-Induced Blindness, 127 YALE L.J. F. 115, 121 (2017), http://www
.yalelawjournal.org/forum/hivelys-self-induced-blindness [http://perma.cc/QJD5-YVRC].
213. Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, 5 SIGNS 631, 645 (1980),
reprinted in RICH, BLOOD, BREAD, AND POETRY: SELECTED PROSE, 1979-1985, at 23, 46
(1986).
214. Id. at 642; see also Kathy Miriam, Toward a Phenomenology of Sex-Right: Reviving Radical Fem-
inist Theory of Compulsory Heterosexuality, 22 HYPATIA 210, 213 (2007) (demonstrating that
modern male culture has appropriated lesbian sexuality as an enhancer for male fantasies).
215. If Ann Hopkins had done all the things her employer wanted her to do- go to charm school,
be less aggressive, wear lipstick-this would have accomplished two things. It would have
made her more stereotypically attractive, a better candidate for a heterosexual relationship,
and it would have likely made her less effective at her job. The partners who denied her
promotion were trying to enforce a regime in which women must please men (sexually, vis-
ually, and temperamentally) and remain financially less endowed than men -the regime of
compulsory heterosexuality.
216. SUZANNE PHARR, HOMOPHOBIA: A WEAPON OF SEXISM 18 (1988). See generally Koppelman,
supra note 81 (arguing that laws that discriminate against lesbian women and gay men rein-
force heterosexual patriarchy and so should trigger heightened scrutiny); Sylvia Law, Homo-
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tion "on account of sex" (the ERA language) would entail a purpose to free
men and women from traditional gender stereotypes. That rule and that pur-
pose are deeply and not just formally inconsistent with policies excluding lesbi-
an and gay people from jobs and rights.
Now we are in a position to see how relational discrimination because of
sex fits into the central purpose of Title VII. If statutory text, structure, and
binding precedent are any guide, the purpose of Title VII is not to favor any
single group, but to entrench a merit-based workplace that does not tolerate
sex-based decision-making- including employer enforcement of prescribed
gender roles (Hopkins) and relational discrimination (Newport News). The ben-
eficiaries of the sex discrimination rule are men (Newport News) as well as
women (Evans and the PDA) - and gays (Hively) as well as straights (Hopkins).
This analysis also suggests a deeper point about Loving, which ruled that
antimiscegenation laws represented unconstitutional racial discrimination. Vir-
ginia's marriage exclusion discriminated equally against both white people
(who married people of color) and people of color (who married white peo-
ple), so the class directly harmed by the different-race marriage bar was "mis-
cegenosexuals," not people of color generally.2 17 Thus, if Judge Sykes really un-
derstood "discrimination" the way she articulated it in her Hively dissent, she
ought to complain that Loving was not entirely logical, because it was invoking
a suspect classification (race) to protect a group defined by their sexuality
(miscegenosexuals). But no one is going to reject Loving and McLaughlin -
universally admired, landmark constitutional precedents that should be the ba-
sis for legal reasoning in related arenas.
Indeed, the apparent lack of symmetry between class and classification in
Loving is easily resolved- and its resolution suggests a similar path for thinking
about the relational discrimination in Hively and Evans. While the class directly
harmed by different-race marriage laws is miscegenosexuals, the class indirect-
ly but deeply harmed is all people of color. What makes the latter conclusion
possible is the purpose of these statutes (white supremacy), which is at odds
with the purpose of equal protection (no race-based castes). Just as the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits (relational) race-based laws forcing prescriptive
stereotypes onto partnerships between people of different races, Title VII as in-
terpreted in Hopkins and amended in 1991 prohibits (relational) sex-based em-
sexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187 (arguing that the disappro-
bation of homosexual behavior is a reaction to the violation of gender norms, and not mere-
ly a reflection of scorn for the sexual practices of lesbian women and gay men).
217. See Samuel A. Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: A Claim of Sex Dis-
crimination Under Title VII, 81 GEO. L.J. 1, 6 (1992) (coining the term "miscegenosexuals"
and making an argument that inspires my argument in text).
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ployer policies forcing prescriptive stereotypes onto partnerships between peo-
ple of the same sex. While the class directly harmed by policies excluding per-
sons with same-sex romantic feelings is lesbian and gay people, the class indi-
rectly but deeply harmed is all women, because the discrimination reflects an
insistence on rigid gender roles that is foundational to patriarchy or sexism, a
philosophy that has been particularly harmful to women's liberties and equal
participation. What makes the latter conclusion possible is the purpose of the
employer policy (prescribing rigid gender roles) and its clash with a central
purpose of Title VII (no prescriptive sex stereotyping).
TABLE 2.
WHYJUDGES SHOULD ACCEPTTHE LOVING ANALOGY FOR LGBT RIGHTS
Class
Csilas Harmful Indirectly ButClassification Immediately IdloyDey
HarmedIdeology DeeplyHarmedHarmed
Racism Racial
Lv in Race Miscegenosexuals (WhiteMcLaughlin S rma) Minorities
Supremacy)
Sexism
ERA Sex Women (Rigid Gender Women
Roles)
Sexism
Baehr; Lesbians; (Rigid Gender
Hively; Sex Gay Men; Roles, cf. Com- Women
Evans Bisexuals pulsory Hetero-
sexuality)
Reflect upon the foregoing table in light of the pre-1991 statutory history of
Title VII, recounted in Section II.A. From the very beginning, an important ar-
gument in favor of barring workplace sex discrimination is that it would free
women from employers' tendency to view them as best suited for domestic du-
ties, namely, keeping house and raising the children borne of heterosexual mar-
riages to men. This was the point of the Supreme Court's first decision inter-
preting Title VII's sex discrimination provision in Martin Marietta. Strongly
endorsing this purpose, Congress in 1972 expanded Title VII's sex discrimina-
tion rules to government employers. And the PDA in 1978 was entirely focused
on pressing employers away from the stereotype that female employees were
not temporary workers, biding their time until they could leave their jobs to
raise a family. The FMLA in 1993 complemented Title VII in this larger project
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of freeing female as well as male employees from such a stereotype. In this way,
Hopkins was a natural conclusion of the conversation by which Congress, the
EEOC, and the Supreme Court were thinking about Title VII over the years.
The substantive holding of Hopkins, in turn, found specific as well as general
affirmation in the congressional override law adopted in 1991.
In short, a legally compelling argument for Kimberly Hively and Jameka
Evans (as well as Donald Zarda) is a synthesis of the Wood-Flaum argument
with the Rosenbaum-Rovner argument. Excluding lesbians and gay men from
employment opportunities is, strictly speaking, a discrimination because of the
sex of the employee and/or the sex of the employee's romantic part-
ner/spouse - and the case for discrimination "because of sex" is much strength-
ened because such discrimination is fundamentally at odds with the central
purpose of Title VII (repeatedly reaffirmed, strengthened, and amplified by
Congress), namely, to protect employees against employer insistence upon
conforming to old-fashioned, rigid gender roles.
C. Sex as Sexuality: Sexual Harassment and the Merit-Based Workplace
Recall Judge Sykes's argument that when we talk about sex, we are not talk-
ing about sexual orientation or even sexuality. She reads the lesbian discrimina-
tion cases to be all about sexuality, which she seems to understand as intrinsi-
cally different from biological sex and gender. Yet her understanding is hard to
defend as a matter of original 1964 meaning, even harder to defend as a matter
of original meaning after the 1991 Amendments, and virtually impossible to de-
fend as a matter of ordinary meaning today.
To the contrary, for more than a generation, "sex discrimination" has been
synonymous with "sexual harassment." Although lacking substantive lawmak-
ing authority under Title VII, the EEOC in 1980 promulgated sexual harass-
ment guidelines to implement the sex discrimination bar.2 18 The guidelines in-
terpreted the statute to prohibit employer tolerance of quid pro quo
harassment, where a supervisor demands sexual favors in return for workplace
advancement or maintenance, and hostile work environments, where there is
pervasive and unwelcome sexual harassment by coworkers. While often reluc-
tant to defer to the EEOC in statutory cases, a unanimous Supreme Court
wrote the agency's sexual harassment guidelines into law in Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson.21 9 Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court drew upon and ex-
218. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (Nov. io, 1980) (codified
at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1604), as amended at 64 Fed. Reg. 58,334 (Oct. 29, 1999).
219. 477 U.S. 57, 65-67 (1986); id. at 74 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
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plicitly endorsed "a substantial body of judicial decisions and EEOC precedent
holding that Title VII affords employees the right to work in an environment
free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult."22 0 Grounded in the
merit-based workplace norm developed in this Feature, this body of judicial
and agency precedent had been developed in the context of race-based discrim-
ination, but the Court without dissent held that the precept of the race discrim-
ination cases carried over without diminution to cases of sex discrimination.
The EEOC's sexual harassment guidelines are a classic example of success-
ful administrative policy entrepreneurship. Not only did the Supreme Court
unanimously adopt their basic structure and prohibitions, but the Court sub-
sequently held that Congress implicitly ratified Meritor in the 1991 Amend-
ments.22 1 The guidelines were a policy whose time had come. For many em-
ployees, the biggest failure of our aspiration for a merit-based workplace has
been sexual harassment by supervisors and coworkers. Speaking for millions of
women in the workplace, Catherine MacKinnon famously objected that the
sexualization of the workplace is a primary reason for women's continuing ine-
quality.222 Although the Chamber of Commerce had dragged its feet on the
PDA (and would do so again on the 1991 Amendments), it was in agreement
with progressive feminists about sexual harassment: a sexually harassing
workplace is, from a business perspective, a major distraction from a produc-
tive worldorce.223
Title VII's sexual harassment jurisprudence represents a major development
not only in the statute's evolution, but also in the nation's small "c" constitu-
tional culture and even in its vocabulary. Professor MacKinnon's pathbreaking
220. Id. at 65 (opinion of the Court); accord Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1993)
(holding that a workplace can be legally abusive even if the employee does not suffer physi-
cal or psychological damage and that the preservation of a merit-based workplace requires
employers to restrain sexually abusive behaviors); id. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (opin-
ing that the judge's inquiry "should center, dominantly, on whether the discriminatory con-
duct has unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff's work performance").
221. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 804 1-4 (1998) (holding that Meritor is entitled
to super-strong stare decisis because the 1991 Amendments "conspicuous [ly]" left it in
place, suggesting that Congress agreed with the Court about "the proper allocation of the
costs of harassment"). As noted above, the Court sometimes finds that Congress has implic-
itly ratified leading Supreme Court decisions but rarely does so for court of appeals deci-
sions, as they are not the final word from the judiciary. See supra note 210 and accompanying
text.
222. MACKINNON, supra note 48.
223. See Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061 (2003) (reporting zealous
business implementation of the sexual harassment guidelines and criticizing such imple-
mentation for intruding into employee autonomy).
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book, which inspired the EEOC's guidelines, was entitled Sexual Harassment of
Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination. Even if sex in 1964 did not entail
sexuality in ordinary parlance (a proposition I dispute), surely by the 198os it
was commonplace to understand sex discrimination to include sexual harass-
ment.
The phenomenon of sexual harassment has deeply affected our culture's
understanding of workplace dynamics, by revealing both the pervasiveness of
sexuality, its relationship to sex as biology and sex as gender, and the threat
that this combination poses to the merit-based ideal. The sexualized workplace
is one where some employees will be distracted, immobilized, passed over for
promotions, or fired for reasons that have nothing to do with their capabilities.
While Professor MacKinnon classically articulated the anti-harassment policy
to protect women in the workplace, she has also emphatically argued that the
anti-harassment policy extends to protect LGBT and straight male employees
as well.224 Unlike Judge Sykes's views, Professor MacKinnon's views are con-
sistent with the classification-based text of Title VII.
Flowing from Professor MacKinnon's vision, some of the most dramatic
applications of Title VII in the last generation have revealed the interconnection
among biological sex, gender role, and sexuality. Gay men sexually assaulting
male employees have been held to create employer liability under Title VII, 2 25
and gay men sexually harassed or even assaulted by male coworkers have often
been afforded relief under Title VII as well. 2 26
Shortly after the 1991 Amendments, the Supreme Court took a case in
which a straight man claimed he was sexually harassed by his male coworkers.
Although a case of male-on-male harassment may have been beyond the imag-
ination of the 1964 Congress, a unanimous Supreme Court ruled that this con-
duct fell within the broad statutory language in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc. 227 Both parties to the appeal agreed that plaintiff Joseph Oncale
224. Brief of National Organization on Male Sexual Victimization et al. as Amici Curiae Support-
ing Petitioners, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (No. 96-568),
1997 WL 471814; see id. at 25-28 (arguing that male-on-male harassment of "homosexual"
employees is clearly sex discrimination, just like male-on-female harassment).
225. See, e.g., Smith v. Pefanis, 652 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (N.D. Ga. 2009); Joyner v. AAA Cooper
Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Ala. 1983); Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs., Inc., 511 F.
Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
226. See, e.g., EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F-3d 444 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc); Rene v.
MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3 d lo61 (9 th Cir. 2002) (en banc); Reed Abelson, Men, In-
creasingly, Are the Ones Claiming Sex Harassment by Men, N.Y. Timls (June 10, 2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/20ol/o6/lo/business/men-increasingly-are-the-ones-claiming
-sex-harassment-by-men.html [http://perma.cc/8G89-2YEV].
227. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
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sufficiently alleged the following conduct on the part of his immediate supervi-
sor: on one occasion, the supervisor placed his penis on the back of Oncale's
head and threatened to anally rape him, as another employee restrained On-
cale; on another occasion, the supervisor placed his penis on Oncale's arm, as
another employee restrained Oncale; in the most shocking incident, the super-
visor and another employee jumped into the shower with a naked and uncon-
senting Oncale, and the supervisor inserted a bar of soap between Oncale's but-
tocks and threatened to rape him, as the other employee restrained Oncale; in
addition to these incidents, the supervisor at least once repeated his threat to
anally rape Oncale.22 8 Oncale repeatedly complained about this sexual harass-
ment, but quit the job when he found no relief from the company.2 29
The Fifth Circuit held that same-sex (i.e., homosexual) harassment of this
sort fell outside the ambit of Title VII, which is limited to harassment of men
against women and, probably, women against men. Oncale's attorneys on ap-
peal argued that the plain meaning of Title VII suggests no such limitation so
long as there is discrimination "because of sex," and that the latter requirement
is met whenever an employee is subjected to unwelcome sexual abuse or
threats. Represented on appeal by one of the nation's preeminent Title VII
scholars, Sundowner responded that Oncale's interpretation "would expand
Title VII beyond its language and legislative purpose by conflating sex discrim-
ination with sexual orientation discrimination."23 0 Sundowner demonstrated
that Congress had repeatedly declined to enact proposals to protect against
sexual orientation discrimination and harassment in the workplace; indeed,
such a proposal was rejected on the floor of the Senate in 1996.231 Leave such
an expansion of Title VII to the political process, urged Sundowner.
Sundowner's arguments had prevailed in the Fifth Circuit, but a unani-
mous Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that there is nothing in the text
or structure of Title VII that would preclude relief for same-sex workplace har-
assment. In some respects, the opinion for the Court was unusually coy: it dis-
creetly set forth the facts of the case in strikingly vague terms, never used the
word "homosexual" to describe the well-pleaded harassment, and ignored
Sundowner's rejected proposals argument. Unpersuaded by Oncale's argument
that sexual harassment per se satisfied the "because of sex" requirement of Title
228. Brief for Petitioner at 4-5, Oncale, 523 U.S. 75 (No. 96-568), 1997 WL 458826; Brief for Re-
spondents at 2-3, Oncale, 523 U.S. 75 (No. 96-568), 1997 WL 634147. The respondents dis-
puted the truth of the allegations but had to accept the allegations for purposes of their mo-
tion to dismiss.
229. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 228, at 4-6.
230. Brief for Respondents, supra note 228, at 5.
231. Id. at 21-22.
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VII, the Court remanded the case to the lower courts to give the plaintiff an
opportunity to satisfy that requirement. In dicta (but dicta joined by all nine
Justices), the opinion for the Court provided some evidentiary routes available
to Oncale on remand, which also illuminate what discrimination because of sex
might mean in Hively and Evans.
First, the Court said that Oncale might offer "direct comparative evidence
about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex
workplace."23 2 Thus, he could argue that, if he had been a female employee, he
would not have been subjected to unconsented sexual contact, threats of rape,
and anal assault while he was naked in the shower. More on point (because a
Title VII lawsuit is filed against the employer, not against fellow employees),
Oncale presumably could have argued that a female employee complaining to
the company that she was being sexually hazed, subjected to unconsented sex-
ual contact, threatened with rape, and anally assaulted while she was naked in a
shower would have been taken seriously, and the employer would have re-
sponded in some way. Oncale alleged that his complaints of male-on-male sex-
ual abuse, threats of rape, and anal assault had not been taken seriously by the
employer ("boys will be boys").233
If Oncale had been able to make this kind of showing, he would have estab-
lished that the company was more intolerant of, and willing to remedy, "heter-
osexual" assaults (men on a woman) than "homosexual" assaults (men on a
man). Even if neither Oncale nor his harassers were self-identified as "gay," the
touching of a male penis on the head and arm of another man, the threats by
one man that he intended to anally rape another man, and the anal abuse of a
naked man by another man wielding a bar of soap while the first naked man
was restrained by a third man, were certainly "homosexual." In this respect,
therefore, employer tolerance of "homosexual" abuse is actionable under Title
VII, as interpreted in Oncale.
Joseph Oncale represented himself as straight, though he may have been
perceived or denigrated as gay by the other men. Should his case come out
differently if Oncale were gay? Surely not. In light of Romer and Lawrence, this
reading of Title VII is supported by the avoidance canon, the principle that
statutes should be interpreted to avoid serious constitutional difficulties.234
That is, a statute requiring employers to discourage heterosexual (man-on-
232. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-81 (dictum).
233. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 228, at 4-6. Long a justification for male sexual assault against
women, "boys will be boys" has expanded into a justification for sexual hazing by purported
"straight" males against gay males, effeminate males, or male newcomers to the workplace.
234. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014); Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 511-12,
526 (2011).
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woman) rape threats, unwelcome penile contact, mock rapes, and other sexual
assaults in the workplace, but allowing them to ignore homosexual (man-on-
man) rape threats, unwelcome penile contact, mock rapes, and other sexual as-
saults against gay or straight men, would surely raise equal protection con-
cerns. As described above, Romer stands for the proposition that the state can-
not, without some public-regarding purpose, exclude lesbians, gay men, and
bisexuals from the ordinary protections of the law.
Second, and relatedly, Oncale would have established discrimination be-
cause of sex if he could have shown that his attackers were themselves "homo-
sexuals" wanting to molest him (and the employer tolerated that conduct).
Lower courts have ruled that same-sex harassment is actionable if motivated by
homosexual lust,23 5 and the Supreme Court said in Oncale that same-sex har-
assment by a "homosexual" supervisor would meet the because-of-sex criteri-
on.236 The logic of these rulings is that "but for" the employee's sex, the sexual
harassment would not occur; the gay supervisor would not make sexual ad-
vances to a woman. This reasoning can be extended to cases where the har-
assers are motivated by homophobia, which is a kind of sexual panic aimed at
men or women because of the sex of their preferred partners. Psychology stud-
ies suggest that at least some homophobic harassment stems from the har-
asser's own (often latent) homosexuality.237 In Oncale, the apparently homo-
phobic harassment involved openly homosexual acts by the hazing supervisor
and other crew members. And common sense suggests that homophobia is a
fear mobilized by same-sex intimacy and/or by a man's departure from his tra-
ditional gender role as inseminator of women.2 38
Third, Oncale probably would have succeeded if he could have shown that
he was attacked and abused because he was gender deviant. The Court's Oncale
opinion did not discuss this avenue for relief, but almost all of the circuit courts
that have ruled on such a case have applied Hopkins to support a Title VII claim
for LGBT workers harassed because of prescriptive gender stereotyping.239 in-
235. See, e.g., Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3 d 998 ( 7 th Cir. 1999); Yeary v. Goodwill
Indus.-Knoxville, 107 F.3 d 443 (6th Cir. 1997); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut, 99 F.3 d 138 (4 th
Cir. 1996); Fry v. Holmes Freight Lines, Inc., 7 2 F. Supp. 2d 1074 (W.D. Mo. 1999).
236. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (dictum).
237. Netta Weinstein et al., Parental Autonomy Support and Discrepancies Between Implicit and Ex-
plicit Sexual Identities: Dynamics of Self-Acceptance and Defense, 102 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 815 (2012).
238. Brief of National Organization on Male Sexual Victimization et al. as Amici Curiae Support-
ing Petitioners, supra note 224.
239. See, e.g., EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3 d 4 4 4 ( 5 th Cir. 2013) (en banc). But see Etsit-
ty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (ioth Cir. 2007) (holding that the prohibition against
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deed, this was the stance taken by the Eleventh Circuit in Evans: even though
Jameka Evans did not have a Title VII claim for discrimination because of sexu-
al orientation (said two of the three judges), she did have a claim for discrimi-
nation because of gender deviance (said all three judges).
Oncale neither holds nor denies that Title VII provides a remedy for (ho-
mo)sexual harassment against gay or bisexual men, but the door for such
claims that was opened wide by Hopkins is ripped off its hinges by Oncale. Put
somewhat differently, it is harder to deny the force of Chief Judge Wood's and
Judge Rovner's opinions in Hively or Judge Rosenbaum's opinion in Evans after
reading the thorough exegesis of Oncale provided above.
To appreciate this last point, consider this remarkable dictum at the end of
the Court's opinion in Oncale: "A professional football player's working envi-
ronment is not severely or pervasively abusive, for example, if the coach smacks
him on the buttocks as he heads onto the field-even if the same behavior
would reasonably be experienced as abusive by the coach's secretary (male or
female) back at the office."240 Penned by the late Justice Scalia, a strict construc-
tionist for antidiscrimination laws, this guidance suggests a dawning apprecia-
tion of the complicated, context-dependent interconnections among sexuality,
gender, and the law of Title VII. What I now suggest is that the relationship
must be more complicated than Justice Scalia apparently realized.
Start with the coach's interaction with his football player, which Justice
Scalia seemed to think is safe from legal liability: Title VII allows male coaches
to butt-smack male players. Based upon his earlier analysis of Oncale's claim,
however, even Justice Scalia would have to concede that a variation of his ex-
ample might be sexual harassment because of sex, that is, if the coach were gay
and "intended" the buttocks-smacking to be "homosexual" (i.e., because of the
male sex of the butt of the abuse). Even if the coach were straight, the player
may still object because he considers the coach's particular butt-smacking tech-
nique to be generally "queer." Once the player makes clear to the coach that this
is unwelcome and disruptive (homo)sexual touching, does the coach not have a
duty to lay off his player's buttocks?
How about this variation: Assume that the player himself is gay and that a
homophobic coach regularly smacks his buttocks while uttering lewd antigay
remarks and threats of sexual assault, along the lines of the supervisor in On-
cale. Does this sexual harassment violate Title VII? Depending on how perva-
sive, hostile, and unwelcome the comments are, I do not see why the player
sex stereotyping does not apply to discrimination against transgender people because they
are transgender).
240. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
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would not have a potential Title VII claim. If a gay man's unwelcome touching
of a straight man's buttocks is a potential violation of Title VII, why shouldn't a
straight man's unwelcome touching of a gay man's buttocks not be potentially a
violation as well? Romer demands some kind of policy explanation for treating
the cases differently. (Even without the benefit of the symmetry of legal rights
suggested by Romer, the player ought to have a claim if the coach would not
have taunted and sexually touched a female because she dated men.)
Justice Scalia intended the example of a coach smacking a jock's butt to be
an "easy case," where there is no Title VII liability-but even the most elemen-
tary understanding of sexuality and gender in the workplace (or on the football
field) reveals this to be a more involved scenario.
Now consider the coach's interaction with his secretary, whom Justice Scalia
assumed would have a potential Title VII claim for buttock-smacking. Note
that Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, included male as well as female secre-
taries. If the coach smacks the buttocks of his male secretary and thereby cre-
ates a hostile environment for him, I do not see why the secretary's or the
coach's sexual orientation should make a difference (and Justice Scalia's opinion
did not suggest that it would). Thus, if the coach knows that he is not sup-
posed to smack the buttocks of his female secretary but feels free to manhandle
the rear end of his male secretary, this conduct might well be a Title VII viola-
tion- regardless of the coach's or the secretary's sexual orientation. The key in-
quiry is whether the sexual contact upends the merit-based workplace because
it is unwelcome and disruptive. The male secretary may consider the buttocks-
smacking unwelcome and disruptive because it is demeaning or effeminizing,
because it is homosexually aggressive, or because it is homophobic -or some
combination of all three perceptions.
The Supreme Court's decision in Oncale also sheds light on the Trump
Administration's interpretation of Title VII. Recall the central argument made
in the brief for Sundowner, the defendant employer: Title VII provides no
remedy for homosexual harassment, because Title VII prohibits only sex dis-
crimination and not sexual orientation discrimination. Sundowner's main evi-
dence was that lower courts had so held and that Congress had rejected bills
that would have provided relief to gay employees.241 Notice that this is exactly
the same argument briefly noted by Judge Sykes in Hively and made in detail
by the Department of Justice in Zarda. The Supreme Court's opinion in Oncale
rejected that argument and implicitly but clearly endorsed the application of
241. Brief for Respondents, supra note 228, at 21-22; accord Brief for Equal Employment Advisory
Council as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 16, Oncale, 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (No.




THE SEX DISCRIMINATION ARGUMENT FOR LGBT WORKPLACE PROTECTIONS
Title VII to provide a remedy for a great deal of homosexual harassment. In-
deed, employer policies that tolerate harassment of gay or bisexual men but
provide remedies for harassment of women are suspect under virtually any
reading of Oncale.242
When the Supreme Court handed down Oncale, Congress had declined to
act on thirty-seven bills, introduced between 1974 and 1996, that would have
provided relief under some circumstances for gay or lesbian employees fired or
harassed because of their sexuality.243 Even though gender and sexual policing
were at the heart of Oncale, neither Justice Scalia, for the Court, nor any other
Justice found Sundowner's argument even worth mentioning. (And recall that
this was the main argument made by Sundowner.) The reason is apparent.
Although the Warren and Burger Courts sometimes found meaning in con-
gressional refusal to adopt legislation or in rejection of such proposals on the
floor of the House or Senate, the Justices were cautious about such evidence,
because it is hard to say why Congress does nothing (the usual explanation is
inertia).244 Inspired by Justice Scalia's legisprudence, the more textualist
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have been even more leery of such evidence. For
the current Court, rejected proposals have only been considered relevant when
Congress enacts a law, considers alternatives, and explicitly rejects those alter-
natives.24 Under Roberts Court practice, Congress's explicit rejection of the
Ervin Amendment in 1972 (a rejection that supports the Hively rule) is more
relevant than Congress's failure to move forward with proposals to bar sexual
orientation discrimination, with a variety of special rules and limits.
The Roberts Court's caution about legislative inaction is well-illustrated in
the context of the Hively issue. Before Oncale, proposals to remedy workplace
discrimination or harassment because of "affectional orientation" or "sexual
orientation" or "nonmarital status" suffered from an almost complete lack of
242. Lesbians would be protected under the equal protection rule of the Fifth Amendment: Con-
gress cannot provide a remedy for straight men, straight women, and gay or bisexual men
suffering sexual harassment and exclude lesbians from such a claim without a justification
that would pass muster under Romer or Craig.
243. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 29, at Attachment A.
244. Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3 d 195, 207 (2d Cir. 2017) (K arzmann, C.J., con-
curring); William N. Eskridge Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REv. 67, 69
(1988). For a systematic critique of the Burger Court's deployment of legislative inaction ar-
guments, see id. at 90-lo8.
245. Compare Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2519-20 (2015) (noting a rejected proposal but giving it a small role, while emphasizing
legislative history suggesting a positive congressional expectation), with Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (rejecting arguments grounded upon rejected congres-
sional proposals).
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congressional attention. As Chief Judge Katzmann observed in Christiansen,
Congress usually fails to vote on bills or even hold hearings because its agenda
is filled with other proposals its members or the relevant committee chairs con-
sider more urgent. Another reason Congress neglects proposals is that they
raise a host of collateral issues, as was the case with all of the early bills, includ-
ing the proposed Civil Rights Amendments Act of 1979, which would have
added "affectional or sexual orientation" as prohibited characteristics to federal
law barring discrimination in public accommodations, federal programs, em-
ployment, housing, and crimes of intimidation.2 46 (In the 1964 Act, only the
employment title barred sex discrimination.)
The 1979 bill was the first to generate congressional hearings. At the begin-
ning of the House subcommittee hearing, the minority counsel noted that the
still-pending ERA might protect "homosexuals," and that the current EEOC
Chair Eleanor Holmes Norton viewed Professor Freund's argument for gay
marriage and perhaps gay rights under Title VII as quite plausible.2 47 Counsel
worried that the proposed legislation would lend support to the ERA argument
for gay marriage, and the witness (San Francisco politician and later Mayor Art
Agnos) very much agreed, to the chagrin of supporters of the legislation (who
probably considered the issue a diversion). Critics of the bill expressed concern
that "affectional or sexual orientation" was too broad a term (they worried that
it would include pedophiles), that homosexual behavior is immoral and should
not be encouraged, and that supporters had not demonstrated that the general-
ly wealthy and privileged (white) homosexual population actually suffered dis-
crimination.24 Similar problems bedeviled the next bill, which endured a con-
tentious House subcommittee hearing in 1982.249 The AIDS epidemic
effectively killed congressional interest in this legislation for the next dozen
years.
In 1994, proponents abandoned the strategy of amending the entire Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and focused on creating a new statutory scheme just for
246. Civil Rights Amendments Act of 1979, H.R. 2074, 96th Cong. (1979). For similar proposals,
see H.R. 1454, 9 7 th Cong. §§ 2-8 (1981); and H.R. 14752, 93d Cong. §§ 2-6 (1974).
247. Civil Rights Amendments Act of 1979: Hearing on H.R. 2o74 Before the Subcomm. on Emp't Op-
portunities of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 9 6th Cong. 15-16 (1980) (question from
James M. Stephens, Minority Associate Labor Counsel).
248. E.g., id. at 26-35 (statement of Reverend Charles Mcllhenny, Pastor of First Orthodox Pres-
byterian Church) (making all the listed objections); id. at 77-78 (question from James M.
Stephens, Minority Associate Labor Counsel) (making the point that even "homosexual"
orientation seemed to include pedophilia, based on his reading).
249. See Civil Rights Act Amendments of 1981: Hearing on H.R. 1454 Before the Subcomm. on Emp't
Opportunities of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 9 7 th Cong. (1982).
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employment discrimination: the proposed Employment Non-Discrimination
Act (ENDA). 25 0 For the first time, a Senate committee held hearings on the is-
sue in 1994, followed by ENDA hearings in a House committee in 1996 and by
a Senate committee in 1997 and 2002.251 In the first full-blown committee re-
port, a Senate committee in 2002 reported ENDA favorably, but minority sena-
tors objected that the bill was not ready for a vote because its text was "overly-
broad and unclear in many respects." 252
An even more detailed report, following subcommittee hearings, came in
2007, when the House Education and Labor Committee reported ENDA favor-
ably (the House passed the bill, but it was not taken up by the Senate). 253 The
report noted that by 2007 almost all of the federal circuit courts had interpreted
Title VII to reject claims by lesbian and gay employees-but concluded that
those lower court decisions should not be treated as authoritative, because they
were inconsistent with Hopkins and Oncale.254 Dissenting from the report, ten
committee members said that they "have consistently stated their opposition to
intentional workplace discrimination. However, H.R. 3685 as reported out of
Committee raises many legitimate concerns that remain unresolved."25 s Among
their complaints about the draft legislation were the following: its religious ex-
250. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1994, S. 2238, 103d Cong. (1994).
251. See Suzanne B. Goldberg et al., The Employment Non-Discrimination Act: Its Scope, History,
and Prospects, in GENDER IDENTITY AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION IN THE
WORKPIACE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 19-1 (Christine Michelle Duffy & Denise M. Visconti eds.,
2014) (providing a detailed analysis of congressional hearings and votes on ENDA from
1994 to 2015).
252. S. REP. No. 107-341, at 39 (2002) (minority views).
253. Although the Trump Justice Department does not (yet) argue that the Lilly Ledbetter Act of
20o9, narrowly overriding one Supreme Court decision, ratified the lower court decisions
rejecting sexual orientation claims under Title VII, the 2007 House Report is the closest leg-
islative history on point. See H. REP. No. 110-406 (2007).
254. Id. at 19-22. By 2007, the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth,
and Tenth Circuits had interpreted Title VII to reject claims for sexual orientation discrimi-
nation. See Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999);
Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3 d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001); Hopkins v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3 d 745, 751-52 (4 th
Cir. 1996); Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979); Vickers v. Fairfield
Med. Ctr., 453 F.3 d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 20o6); Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care
Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3 d 701, 704 (7 th Cir. 2000), overruled by Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of
Ind., 853 F-3d 339 (7 th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876
F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989); DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 ( 9 th
Cir. 1979), overruled on other grounds by Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864
(9 th Cir. 2001); Medina v. Income Support Div., N.M., 413 F.3 d 1131, 1135 (ioth Cir. 2005).
255. H. REP. No. 110-406, at 46 (2007) (minority views).
391
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
emption was too narrow, the introduction of a claim for discrimination based
on "perceived" sexual orientation was confusing and ill-defined, the ERISA ex-
emption provision was controversial, and there was confusion about whether
gender identity should be added as an additional grounds for nondiscrimina-
tion.256 Additionally, "the bill fails to provide a proper balance with respect to
retaliation, unfairly according protections to one class of employees but not
others."25 7 Both the majority and the minority on the committee agreed that Ti-
tle VII protects all employees against status-based discrimination and that in-
tentional discrimination against gay employees is not defensible.
At no point did the dissenting members disagree with the Committee's
view that Hopkins and Oncale overrode lower court decisions barring gay and
lesbian employees from Title VII relief. Also, notably absent from the minority
views were the arguments made in the 198os that homosexual conduct is im-
moral and ought not to be encouraged, that homosexuality is a mental defect,
or that gay workers are predatory and disruptive; not a single member of the
committee claimed that lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals do not belong in the
merit-based workplace on the same terms as straight employees. And, as quot-
ed above, all the dissenters said they "have consistently stated their opposition
to intentional workplace discrimination,"25 presumably including discrimina-
tion against lesbian and gay employees who are capable of doing their jobs.
The most interesting punch line of the foregoing discussion is that the rele-
vant congressional committees were generally aware that an increasing number
of lower courts were closing off Title VII to lesbian and gay claimants -at the
same time that the Supreme Court was opening up Title VII to claims of gen-
der stereotyping and (homo)sexual harassment. Ironically, Congress publicly
acknowledged the tension between the Supreme Court's precedents and the
circuit court precedents before any of the circuit courts did.25 9
The congressional deliberations and case law teach that Title VII's meta-
purpose is to ensure a merit-based workplace, namely, a productive space free
of sexual or gender harassment. Now apply Title VII's sexual harassment juris-
prudence to Hively. If Ivy Tech's football coach had publicly humiliated Hively
by smacking her buttocks and denigrating her for being a lesbian, she probably
256. Id. at 46-48, 53-59.
257. Id. at 6o; see id. at 58-59 (objecting that though the bill protects employees against retalia-
tion because of discrimination complaints, the majority rejected a GOP proposal to protect
religious employees against employer retaliation when they object to policies that are too
gay-friendly).
258. Id. at 46.
259. Id. at 19-22; see supra text accompanying notes 253-257.
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would have a Title VII sex discrimination claim. So why should Hively not
have a Title VII claim if Ivy Tech's administration refuses to hire her because
she is a woman who loves other women? The Loving analogy suggests she has
an associational discrimination claim and Hopkins suggests she has a claim
grounded in gender stereotypes.
III. TITLE VII'S MERIT-BASED WORKPLACE UNDER A TEXTUALIST
COURT AND A GRIDLOCKED CONGRESS
As a matter of the nation's antidiscrimination policy, our deep dive into
Hively, Evans, and Zarda reveals several important conceptual themes. First,
Congress, the EEOC, and the Supreme Court have committed the nation to a
meritocratic norm of employment evaluation that disfavors the listed personal
characteristics, because they are unrelated to merit, and favors the integration,
under conditions of equality, of women, racial minorities, religious minorities,
and sexual and gender minorities long excluded from and harassed within the
workplace. This commitment has long entailed skepticism about employer pol-
icies that exclude or penalize employees because of the race or sex of their
spouses, romantic partners, or families. This concept of relational discrimination
is at the heart of Title VII, and if McLaughlin and Loving are any guide, rela-
tional discrimination has been an important target since the enactment (1964)
and early expansion (1972) of Title VII. Because sexual orientation is a classic
example of relational identity, gay or lesbian employees like Kimberly Hively,
Jameka Evans, and Donald Zarda are exemplary of this concept.
Second, cases like these illustrate a distinction that has long been integral to
Title VII but was controversial until the 198os. From the beginning, and deep-
ening over time, the purpose of Title VII has been to encourage employers to
make merit-based decisions and to discourage employers from making deci-
sions based upon stereotypes about men and women, as well as workers of
different races, ethnicities, or religions. Merit is the antithesis of stereotyping.
Often, these stereotypes are descriptive-women are too emotional or weak to
do this kind of job - and most sex discrimination lawsuits have attacked gener-
alized views that are often patently false as a general matter or unjustified in
particular cases. Increasingly apparent are stereotypes that are prescriptive -
women ought to be feminine, cooperative, or married/partnered with men-
and many classic sex discrimination cases (such as the pregnancy cases) involve
prescriptive stereotypes as a suppressed feature. Hopkins and Johnson Controls
illustrate the centrality of prescriptive stereotypes as an object of Title VII.
Hively and Evans are recent examples.
Third, some judges say they are reluctant to sexualize Title VII-but that
ship sailed decades ago. Judges cannot blink the reality that the workplace is
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sexualized, perhaps more so than ever before, as it has become more integrated
with female workers, employees of color, and openly LGBT employees. The
norm against sexual harassment in the workplace -propounded by feminist
thinkers, adopted by the EEOC, assimilated into governing precedent by the
Supreme Court, and implicitly ratified by Congress -has entrenched sexuality
as a core project of Title VII. It has long been clear in American public law (as
well as Title VII jurisprudence) that sexuality and gender are inseparable. Hive-
ly and Evans illustrate how deeply the fates of women, gay men and lesbians,
and transgender people are intertwined in American public law -an underap-
preciated theme that animates the marriage equality constitutional norm as
well.
The foregoing analysis has been backward-looking. Now look forward.
What does the future look like for Title VII?
The next half century of Title VII will surely have some important discon-
tinuities with its first fifty years. Start with the next three years, during which
the Supreme Court will most likely address this issue: does employer discrimi-
nation against gay, lesbian, and bisexual workers amount to discrimination be-
cause of sex?26 0 The Court that will decide the issue will be more textualist and
more ideologically splintered than earlier Courts. Congress may or may not
remain strongly conservative, but it will probably remain gridlocked and,
therefore, incapable of overriding the Court as it frequently did during the first
fifty years of civil rights law. The executive branch will be less supportive of the
rights of sexual and gender minorities, as illustrated by the Trump Administra-
tion's astonishing amicus brief in Zarda.261
What might the five most textualist Justices (all older men appointed by
Republican Presidents), nudged to the right by the Department of Justice and
unchecked by Congress, do with Title VII? One path would be that suggested
by Judges Sykes and Pryor. Applying "original meaning," a textualist Court
could read the statutory language narrowly, that is, to deny rights to a small
group of sexualized and gender-bending employees. This Feature has suggest-
26o. The same Court might also address the related issue of whether Title VII protects
transgender persons. E.g., Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist., 858 F.3 d 1034 (7 th Cir.
2017) (holding that it does). The Court recently encountered the question of whether Title
IX's bar to discrimination because of sex, applicable to schools receiving federal funds, pro-
tects transgender students and teachers. The Obama Administration had taken the position
that Title IX does protect transgender students against discrimination. This was an issue in
Gloucester County School Board v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017), a Title IX case
where the lower court deferred to the Obama Administration's interpretation; the Supreme
Court granted review and then vacated and remanded the lower court decision in light of
the new Title IX guidance issued by the Trump Administration.
261. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 29.
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ed the conceptual moves such a Court might make: Insist that the ordinary
meaning of discrimination because of sex is biology and not gender or sexuali-
ty. Articulate Title VII's purpose as equalizing opportunities for women and
men in the workplace, and nothing more. Marginalize relational discrimination
claims as exceptional and confine them to the race arena. Redirect the focus
away from the 1991 Amendments, object to any reference to the legislative his-
tory of those Amendments, and refocus on the whole code, where Congress
sometimes bars discrimination because of both sex and sexual orientation.
Leave the issue to the legislative process and eschew any judicial authority to
radically expand Title VII. To accomplish this analytical coup, the Court would
have to ignore a great deal of the statutory history; explain away the broad Ti-
tle VII text (including text added in 1991); exclude in-depth congressional de-
liberations; and narrow, reconceptualize, or overrule some of its precedents,
such as Newport News, Oncale, and, especially, Hopkins. That Hopkins has been
underwritten by Congress renders an attack on that precedent especially ques-
tionable as a matter of law and democracy.
To be sure, the Roberts Court has shown itself willing to interpret Title VII
stingily, as illustrated by its decisions following and expanding upon Ledbetter
v. Goodyear Tire.262 That decision ruled that women denied equal pay are barred
from Title VII lawsuits because of the short statutory limitations period, even
though the female employees would not reasonably have known about the pay
disparity within the limitations period. Although Congress overrode Ledbetter
in 2009, the Court has continued to treat it as a "shadow precedent" (Deborah
Widiss's felicitous term), and has essentially confined the override to a narrow
space, notwithstanding the congressional deliberations.2 63 in University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,264 the Court imposed on plaintiffs in Ti-
tle VII retaliation cases a high burden of showing causation. The 5-4 majority
not only found inapplicable the Civil Rights Act of 1991's partial override of
Hopkins (which did not revise Title VII's retaliation provision), but invoked, as
precedent for a higher burden on plaintiffs, the Hopkins dissenting opinion,
262. 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123
Stat. 5 (2009).
263. See Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory
Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REv. 859 (2012); see also Deborah A. Widiss, Still Kickin' After All
These Years: Sutton and Toyota as Shadow Precedents, 63 DRAKE L. REV. 919 (2015) (demon-
strating that lower courts sometimes continue to follow shadow precedents even when the
statutory override is directly on point and dispositive).
264. 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
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which the Court had recently followed when interpreting the age discrimina-
tion law.265
Ledbetter and Nassar suggest that as many as five Justices are sometimes
willing to read the text of Title VII narrowly and to interpret statutory prece-
dents and even overrides narrowly. It would be a much bigger move, however,
for those Justices to attack Hopkins - either by overruling or (more likely) nar-
rowly interpreting that super-precedent. An even more daring, but no longer
inconceivable, strategy would be to reconceive antigay employment rules as
policies involving disruptive expression or disapproved conduct or both. This
argument works best in cases where the employer can conceptualize its dis-
crimination as a matter of its own religious expression. Such Justices can then
argue that the employer is certainly not discriminating "because of sex" or even
"because of sexual orientation"; at most, the employer is discriminating be-
cause of the alarming messages conveyed by an employee's unfortunate pre-
sumed behavior. The Alliance Defending Freedom (ADF) has been running
this kind of argument in antigay discrimination cases,266 and Judge Pryor's
concurring opinion in Evans gestures toward this argument as well.2 6 7 Note
that this conflation of status/identity and choice/behavior finds a direct parallel
in segregationists' insistence two generations ago that God required separation
of the races, especially their sexual separation.2 68 Indeed, the trial court in Lov-
ing made pretty much the same argument: Virginia's antimiscegenation law
was not at all discriminatory and was not a status-based law, for it merely im-
plemented God's Word and regulated immoral behavior.2 69 (Obviously, the
Supreme Court rejected that argument in Loving.) The parallels between an-
tigay tropes and argumentation and long-renounced racist tropes and argu-
mentation ought to give judges pause before they accept them.
265. Justice Kennedy, who wrote the Hopkins dissent, wrote the majority opinion in Nassar. He is
currently considered the median Justice on Title VII issues.
266. See e.g., Lexington Fayette Urban Cry. Human Rights Comm'n v. Hands on Originals, Inc.,
No. 2015-CA-000 745-MR, 2017 WL 2211381 (Ky. Ct. App. May 12, 2017) (observing that one
judge accepted the ADF argument in text and that another accepted the ADF defense based
on the state RFRA).
267. Evans v. Ga. Reg'l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1258-59 (11th Cir. 2017) (Pryor, J., concurring) (ar-
guing that Jameka Evans, a lesbian employee, was discriminated against because of her cho-
sen "behavior," and not her sex-based "status").
268. William N. Eskridge Jr., Noah's Curse: How Religion Often Conflates Status, Belief and Conduct
To Resist Antidiscrimination Norms, 45 GA. L. REv. 657, 665-72 (2011) (documenting the reli-
gion-based support for slavery, apartheid, and antimiscegenation laws based upon sexual
misconduct of people of color, the descendants of Ham, who are assertedly condemned in
the Bible).
269. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1967) (describing the state trial court's reasoning).
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What a conservative textualist majority has the power to do is not neces-
sarily what a conservative textualist majority ought to do in a case raising the
Hively issue, however. To begin with, many conservatives and most textualists
believe in the rule-of-law virtues of predictability, objectivity, and consistency
in statutory interpretation- and I have yet to see a serious rule-of-law engage-
ment with the Hively issue that refutes the conclusion reached by Chief Judge
Wood. In my opinion, her interpretation is supported by original meaning, the
often-reiterated statutory purpose of the merit-based workplace (also explicitly
written into the statutory text by the PDA), Supreme Court statutory prece-
dents ratified by Congress, congressional deliberations in 1964 and over time as
the law has been amended, practical considerations articulated by the imple-
menting agency and by judges, and the constitutional equality norms an-
nounced in Romer and Lawrence.
Any poorly researched effort to reject Chief Judge Wood's or Judge Flaum's
interpretation based upon original meaning risks exposing original meaning
jurisprudence as entirely unconstraining or result-oriented. Scholars have al-
ready lampooned original meaning jurisprudence as nothing more than look-
ing out over the crowd and picking out your friends.270 Is this a jurisprudence
of judicial restraint? Conversely, the opinions of Chief Judge Wood and Judge
Flaum are better exemplars of conservative textualist analysis, a point as to
which strong conservative textualist Judges Easterbrook and Ripple seem to
agree. If law is to be neutral, and if judges see themselves as following the logic
of preexisting law wherever it leads them, Hively is an excellent case for con-
servative textualist judges to offer some proof that their method is not ideolog-
ically slanted.
Consider this thought experiment. Assume a judge who is politically con-
servative but determined to read statutes to be consistent with the rule of law
and the normal operation of the democratic lawmaking process. Call her a
"rule-of-law judge." Such a judge might not be delighted that Title VII protects
lesbian employees, would oppose such a policy were she a legislator or an
270. E.g., James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neu-
tral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1 (2005) (demonstrating that conservative Republican tex-
tualist judges arbitrarily deploy textual canons to interpret employment statutes narrowly
and contrary to congressional purposes and specific expectations). Compare SCALA & GAR-
NER, supra note 35, at 377 (claiming that legislative history empowers judges, because using
such history is like "entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the
guests for one's friends"), with William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative
Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (2013) (reviewing the Scalia and Garner book and arguing
that their reliance on textual canons presents even greater opportunities for result-oriented
judges to cherry-pick and that text-based sources alone do little to constrain judges in hard
cases).
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agency head, and would not strain the statute to do so -yet there are strong ar-
guments in support of the Hively interpretation that such a principled jurist
ought to find persuasive.
To begin with, a rule-of-law judge would want to ground her interpretation
in statutory text. As demonstrated above, the plain meaning of Section
703(a)(1) supports relief. If the allegations of the complaint are true, Ivy Tech
discriminated "because of . .. sex" when it refused to consider Hively for a
permanent position because of her sex (as a woman attracted to other women)
or because of the sex of her partner (female). Would it not be discrimination
because of race if Ivy Tech had excluded her because she was a white woman
married to a black man? Or a Catholic married to a Muslim? Nothing in the
text of Section 703(a)(1) suggests that the race case, the religion case, and the
sex case ought to be decided differently. If one wants to be a neutral textualist,
one needs to apply plain meanings to reach some results on grounds of con-
sistency that one would not vote for as a legislator.
Second, rule-of-law judges (especially the new textualists) maintain that
statutory interpretation is a holistic endeavor: the interpreter needs to examine
the text in light of the whole act.271 The Title VII we interpret today is not the
1964 statute, but a statute that has been created over time. The whole act sup-
ports relief in a variety of important ways: Title VII presumptively treats race
and sex discrimination the same (thereby strengthening the Loving analogy),
and when Congress wanted race and sex to be treated differently, the statute
says so explicitly in the provision creating a defense for sex (but not race) dis-
crimination if sex is a bona fide occupational qualification, namely, the Weberi-
an, merit-based demands of the job require it.2 72 The PDA amendment to Title
VII explicitly commits the statute to the merit-based workplace norm and im-
plicitly commits the statute to extensive regulation of purely prescriptive stere-
otypes (a project further advanced by the FMLA). And the 1991 Amendments
both confirm Hopkins and expand its allowance of Title VII lawsuits where sex
is one "motivating factor" (the point emphasized by Judge Flaum's Hively opin-
ion). By no stretch do the 1991 Amendments ratify the isolated court of appeals
decisions that had read lesbian and gay employees out of Title VII.
271. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Alito, J.); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)
(Thomas, J.); United Says. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371
(1988) (Scalia, J.).
272. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 §703(e), 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-2(e) (1964) (allowing a
BFOQ defense for some discrimination because of sex, religion, and national origin, but not
for race and color). Other provisions of Title VII create special carve-outs allowing discrimi-
nation because of religion. E.g., Title VII § 702,42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-1.
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Third, and relatedly, a rule-of-law judge respects the operation of the legis-
lative process as a means for our polity to tackle significant problems in a dem-
ocratically accountable way. For this reason, such a judge ought to take serious-
ly the statutory plan.27 3 In my view, this is the key area of contest. What exactly
is Title VII's plan? A reading of the statute that limits its aim to employer poli-
cies that apply different rules to men and women, without more, is not a plau-
sible understanding of Title VII. It does not track the text of the statute (which
focuses on illegal classifications, not treatment of classes of employees), is in-
consistent with Title VII's treatment of race discrimination, and is at odds with
Section 703(m). A better reading of the statutory plan links it to the merit-
based workplace, freed of sex-based criteria. As Section 701(k) says, pregnant
women-like all other women and men-must be treated the same as other
employees "similar in their ability or inability to work."2 74
While some rule-of-law judges are famously suspicious of legislative histo-
ry, the most famous textualist in American history (i.e., Justice Scalia) was
willing to consult it, for the same reasons he freely consulted The Federalist Pa-
pers, to understand how text was understood by contemporaries and to discern
the statutory plan.2 75 It is hard to read the legislative history of the 1964 Act,
the 1972 Amendments, the 1978 PDA, and the 1991 Amendments without ap-
preciating the overwhelming congressional consensus that Congress meant
what it said in Section 703: Title VII has a broad, ambitious plan, and that plan
is to entrench a merit-based workplace that is free of stereotype-laden employ-
er policies, harassing conduct, and non-meritocratic exclusions. It would re-
quire a relatively headstrong judge, determined to read her own views into the
statute, to ignore this overwhelming history and the democratic legitimation it
bestows on such a reading of Title VII's plan.
Fourth, a rule-of-law judge ought to consider binding statutory precedents
and ought to give them a reading consistent with the statutory plan.2 76 As sug-
gested in this Feature, the Supreme Court's precedents in Newport News, Hop-
kins, and Oncale strongly support Hively's position. It is possible to read these
273. Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2521-22
(2015) (K ennedy, J.); King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.); Util. Air Regulatory Grp.
v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442-44 (2014) (Scalia, J.).
274. Title VII § 7o1(k), 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe(k) (1964).
275. Scalia & Manning, supra note 39, at 1618; accord Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys.
for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (critically relying on legislative
history to explain the structure of the Endangered Species Act of 1973).
276. See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (Roberts, C.J.); Vance
v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2449-52 (2013) (Alito, J.); Patterson v. McLean Credit Un-
ion, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (K ennedy, J.).
399
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
decisions more narrowly than I have read them, but few lower court judges
have done so, and a narrow reading would be strongly inconsistent with the
statutory history of Title VII. Indeed, Congress itself closely examined Hopkins,
heard overwhelming support for the substantive, prescriptive stereotype por-
tion of that precedent, and overrode the burden of proof portion of that prece-
dent. Textualists and pragmatists alike have said that the Supreme Court
should follow its own statutory precedents, and have an especially keen duty to
apply them faithfully when Congress has deliberated about them and implicitly
ratified them.27 7
Fifth, a rule-of-law judge ought to consider the regulatory history of a stat-
ute, namely, its application by administrators over time.278 That the EEOC has
championed the broad statutory plan (i.e., the merit-based workplace) in its
pregnancy guidance, its sexual harassment guidelines, and its strong and sus-
tained opposition to prescriptive as well as descriptive stereotypes in the work-
place is just as significant as its relatively recent view that discrimination
against LGBT employees is discrimination because of sex. This regulatory his-
tory is significant because it reflects a longstanding body of experience with Ti-
tle VII that employers have accepted and relied on to shape their policies. In-
dustry reliance or acquiescence in a longstanding regulatory history is not the
equivalent to statutory text and precedent in the rule-of-law universe, but a
rule-of-law judge ought to be fairly certain the text is clear before she ignores
regulatory history.
Sixth, a rule-of-law judge ought to interpret statutes to avoid conflict with
the Constitution.2 79 The original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause was
to abolish "class legislation," laws privileging the few or excluding particular
groups from the protections and benefits of the law.280 As the Cato Institute,
Professor Steven Calabresi, and other principled constitutional conservatives
have argued, such a constitutional original meaning militates against exclu-
277. See, e.g., Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2426-27 (Roberts, C.J.); Patterson, 491 U.S. at 172-73 (Ken-
nedy, J.).
278. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing for
Chevron deference to the EEOC's views, to which most judges accord only Skidmore defer-
ence).
279. See Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014) (Roberts, C.J.); Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S.
493, 509-514, 525-527 (2011) (Kennedy, J.); Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder,
557 U.S. 193 (2010) (Roberts, C.J.); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (20o6) (Scalia,
J., plurality opinion).
28o. Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 83, at 1418-19; William N. Eskridge Jr., Original Meaning
and Marriage Equality, 52 Hous. L. REv. 1067, 1074-91 (2014).
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sions of LGBT persons from general protections of the law.281 While this point
remains controversial (but in a diminishing number of communities), princi-
pled conservatives ought to recognize LGBT persons as equal citizens.
An interpretation of Title VII that protects straight employees who happen
to be gender-deviant (Hopkins) or whose buttocks have been smacked by gay
supervisors or other employees (dicta in Oncale), while at the same time refus-
ing to protect gay employees who are gender-deviant (Hively) or whose faces
have been smacked by homophobic supervisors or other employees (Rene), is a
Title VII regime at odds with the original meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause. That Romer and Lawrence have applied the Equal Protection Clause to
protect against this kind of special exclusion of gay people is a further rule-of-
law reason to follow Chief Judge Wood and Judge Flaum.282
Another kind of conservative judicial philosophy (associated with legal pro-
cess theory) admits that strict legal analysis does not always produce clear an-
swers and that hard cases call forth responses that consider institutionalist val-
ues.283 The judiciary is one of the three branches of the federal government-
the "least dangerous branch," according to the Framers of the Constitution.2 84
If the Hively issue were a close call on the merits, a conservative institutionalist
such as the Chief Justice might worry about the effect of different rulings on
the judiciary's political capital-the confidence that We the People have in
judges' ability to deliver a rule of law that makes sense to them.28 5 Although a
hard core continues to favor job discrimination against sexual and gender mi-
norities, at least in some circumstances, overwhelming majorities of Americans
281. Brief of Amici Curiae Cato Institute, William N. Eskridge Jr., and Steven Calabresi in Sup-
port of Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, -562, -571, -
574), 2015 WL 1062557.
282. To be sure, some conservative textualists would overrule precedents they consider unsup-
ported by original constitutional or statutory meaning, but virtually no jurist in America to-
day would overrule all four decisions -Romer, Lawrence, Hopkins, and Oncale. A Supreme
Court that overruled all four (or even most) of these decisions would unleash a firestorm of
rule-of-law protest -in part because all four of the decisions are consistent with original
meaning and in part because a wide array of businesses, religious groups and leaders, econ-
omists and policy experts, and civil libertarians support and have relied on the norms en-
trenched by those precedents.
283. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962) (espousing a cautious institutionalist approach to hard cases
and arguing that the "passive virtues" of avoidance or narrow decision making are usually
appropriate).
284. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
285. Scholars have found that for politically controversial issues, the Court rarely departs from
attitudes that enjoy wide public support. See, e.g., PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONTROVERSY (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008).
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believe that job discrimination based on sexual orientation is inconsistent with
the merit-based workplace.286 Indeed, in my experience, many Americans are
astounded that Title VII does not already protect lesbian, gay, and bisexual em-
ployees.
Another conservative institutional norm is what Anita Krishnakumar calls
the "anti-messiness principle."287 When the Supreme Court decides statutory
cases, it usually sets forth a rule of law that the lower courts will implement.
The anti-messiness principle suggests that the Court will and ought to consider
which point of law would be easiest for lower courts to administer in a predict-
able and consistent manner. Judge Rovner's panel opinion in Hively (extensive-
ly quoted above) lays out a persuasive administrability case for the Hively en
banc point of law.288 The current regime, where most circuits say that gay and
lesbian employees have no claim for relief under Title VII as "homosexuals" but
have a potential claim as Hopkins-like gender-benders, is very hard to adminis-
ter, for the reasons laid out by Judge Rovner. Unless the Supreme Court com-
pletely overrules Hopkins, the lower courts will continue to struggle with the
vexing issue of figuring out when a gay employee's case includes enough gen-
der stereotyping to fit under Hopkins or whether it really just involves sexual
orientation discrimination, and so falls under a Title VII embargo (if the Su-
preme Court rejects Hively). The simplest approach, consistent with the rule of
law and precedent, for the Supreme Court to take would be to include relation-
al discrimination within Title VII's bar to discrimination "because of sex." To be
sure, a conservative legal-process judge such as the Chief Justice would not find
administrability decisive if the statutory text, plan, and precedents cut only one
way-but in close cases or cases where the Justices struggle to articulate the
precise rule of law, administrability should be and often is an important con-
sideration.289
Consider a final way some conservative judges might think about these is-
sues: Judge Posner's concurring opinion. Shorn of his impatience with close
textual analysis or governing precedent and stripped of his provocative "judi-
286. Gay and Lesbian Rights, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1651/gay-lesbian-rights.aspx
[http://perma.cc/HQ3R-D2YC] (reporting that the latest Gallup poll, from 2008, found
that eighty-nine percent of respondents believed that "homosexuals" should have the same
job opportunities as everyone else; much lower numbers, but still majorities, favor allowing
"homosexuals" to be elementary school teachers and clergy).
287. Anita S. Krishnakumar, The Anti-Messiness Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 87 NOTRE
DAMEL. REV. 1465, 1469 (2012).
288. See supra Section II.B.3.
289. E.g., United States v. Tinldeberg, 563 U.S. 647, 656-659 (2011); Hertz v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77,
94-95 (2010); Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 527 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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cial updating" rhetoric, Judge Posner's concurring opinion is best read as an
ongoing implementation of the merit-based workplace norm protected by Title
VII. Just as the Sherman Act's open-textured prohibition of restraints of trade
and monopolization (terms left undefined) authorizes judges to apply the stat-
ute to carry forth its liberal purpose (consumer welfare), so Judge Posner ar-
gues that Title VII's open-textured prohibition of discrimination because of sex
(terms left largely undefined) authorizes judges to apply the statute to carry
forth its liberal purpose, namely, a Weberian workplace where merit-based per-
formance and not status-based characteristics (race, sex, religion) are determi-
native. 2 90
Judge Sykes urges caution before treating Title VII as a "common law stat-
ute" just like the Sherman Act; I agree with her that unguided judicial updating
is not the norm, especially when Congress has revisited the statute as often it
did Title VII between 1964 and 1991. But the analysis in this Feature suggests
that a faithful attention to the textual and legislative evolution of the law cre-
ates a more legitimate foundation for statutory updating. Like most civil rights
groups, many and perhaps most employers will agree with Judge Posner when
this issue is considered by the Supreme Court: workplace efficiency as well as
fairness are undermined by tolerating gendered stereotypes, whether they hold
back all women or men, or just some men or women, or lesbian and gay em-
ployees, or transgender workers.
Most appealing for Judge Posner's perspective is that statutes have got to
evolve to meet the social or economic necessities that called them forth in the
first place.2 91 For most of its history, Title VII has not really been a common
law statute, as Congress and the EEOC have aggressively participated in its
evolution. Since 1991, Congress has amended Title VII in one relatively minor
way (the Ledbetter override), and the EEOC has more often seen its suggestions
290. As the 1964 Congress (and its successors in 1972, 1978, and 1991) envisioned, Title VII is a
super-statute, much like the Sherman Act and the landmark environmental laws. See WIL-
LIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEw AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION (2010). Super-statutes such as these create powerful new normative base-
lines for the country, and they operate through an institutionally interactive process to apply
the baselines to new circumstances. The world of 2017 is not quite the same world of 1964,
for today's workplace is populated with women (often in managerial positions) as well as
men, gays as well as straights, transgender individuals as well as cisgender individuals. The
original statutory command- no discrimination because of sex- is a powerful one, a com-
mand that would be demeaned by an exceedingly stingy reading of the text.
291. This thesis has been advanced and defended in GUIDO CAIABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE
AGE OF STATUTES 85-86 (1982); and ESKRIDGE, supra note 36.
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dismissed by the Solicitor General and by the Supreme Court.292 In that sense,
Judge Posner is right: since 1991, Title VII has become a common law statute
like the Sherman Act (which has seen no significant congressional amendment
for a longer time). Like the Sherman Act, Title VII has generated thoughtful
Supreme Court precedents that have applied the statute and its underlying
purpose to address new social and workplace issues that were not salient in
1964 or 1972. From a Posnerian perspective-which is a libertarian conservative
one -the simple efficiency aspiration of the Sherman Act (consumer welfare)
finds a parallel in the simple efficiency aspiration of Title VII (the merit-based
workplace).
The merit-based workplace, like Title VII, is a work in progress. The debate
among court of appeals judges in Hively and Evans has enriched this work. My
hope is that a deeper examination of the legal and constitutional sources rele-
vant to the issue of lesbian, gay, and bisexual persons in the workplace will
contribute to the Supreme Court's examination as well.
404
292. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Solicitor General as Mediator Between Court and Agency, 2009
MICH. ST. L. REv. 185, 197-99 (providing examples where the Solicitor General rejected or
ignored EEOC interpretations in Title VII cases before the Supreme Court).
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